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Extending coverage to the informal sector is a key challenge to achieving universal coverage 
through contributory health insurance schemes. Ghana introduced a mandatory National 
Health Insurance scheme in 2004 to provide financial protection for both the formal and 
informal sectors through a combination of taxes and annual premium payments. As part of its 
election campaign in 2008, the current government (then in opposition) promised to make the 
payment of premium ‘one-time’. This has been a very controversial policy issue in Ghana. 
This study sought to contribute relevant information to assess the feasibility of the proposed 
policy by exploring the understandings of various stakeholders of the policy, their 
interests/concerns, potential positions, power and influences on it as well as the general 
prospects and challenges for its implementation. The data was gathered from a review of 
relevant documents in the public domain, 28 key informant interviews and 6 focus group 
discussions with key stakeholders in Accra and two other districts. The results show that 
there is a lot of confusion in stakeholders’ understanding of the policy issue and because of 
the uncertainties surrounding it, most powerful stakeholders are yet to take clear positions on 
it. However, stakeholders raised concerns that revolved around issues such as: the meaning of 
one-time payment within the context of an insurance policy, the affordability of the one-time 
premium, financing and sustainability of the policy as well as the impact of such a policy on 
equity in overall access to health care.  Policy-makers therefore need to clearly explain the 
meaning of the one-time premium policy and how it will be funded and critically consider the 
concerns raised by stakeholders before proceeding with further attempts to implement it. For 
other countries planning universal coverage reforms, it is important that the terminology of 
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Part A: The study protocol       
 Word count=7,689 excluding references 
1. Background 
1.1. Introduction to health care financing and universal coverage (UC) 
A key goal of health systems is to ensure that adequate financial resources are made available 
in order to provide sufficient access to needed health services for all residents (WHO 2007). 
This is done through the processes of revenue collection, resources and risk pooling, 
purchasing, and the provision of services (Kutzin 2001).  Direct out-of-pocket payments and 
prepayment mechanisms are the main instruments for financing health care (McIntyre 2007). 
Out-of-pocket (OOP) payments include: user fees charged at public health facilities, full fees 
paid to private health care providers, and co-payments and deductibles paid by members of 
an insurance scheme (McIntyre 2007). Out-of-pocket payments are regressive, they do not 
involve risk pooling and they often lead to catastrophic health care expenditure (Arhin-
Tenkorang 2000, Xu 2003, McIntyre 2006). Hence, they are not effective in providing 
financial protection against health care costs as compared to prepayment mechanisms (WHO 
2005b). Prepayment mechanisms are means through which people contribute regularly either 
through taxes or insurance premiums towards the cost of health care (McIntyre 2007). Those 
prepayment systems that are progressively structured and involve risk pooling have been 
acknowledged as the most powerful means of attaining universal coverage in health care 
(Carrin, James 2004, Carrin, Evans & Xu 2007, WHO 2010).   
Universal coverage in health care entails achieving universal financial protection and 
equitable access to needed services by residents (Kutzin 2007, McIntyre, Kutzin 2010). To 
move towards universal financial protection requires that all individuals and households are 
protected against the impoverishing consequences of out-of-pocket payments for health care 















Apart from a few countries such as Germany, Japan, Korea and Thailand which have attained 
universal coverage (Carrin, James 2004, Evans 2007, Tangcharoensathein et al. 2011), many 
low-and middle-income countries with very large informal sectors are finding it difficult to 
arrive at the destination of universal coverage (McIntyre 2007, WHO 2005a, Samson 2009).   
1.2. The historical context of health care financing in Ghana 
Ghana is a lower-middle- income country with a very large informal sector which has over 
the years implemented several different health care financing mechanisms - all in the search 
for an appropriate strategy of providing needed health care to its residents. Mechanisms for 
financing health care in Ghana have since the colonial era seen several transformations 
corresponding with changes in political and economic conditions.  As a strategy of limiting 
expenditure, health care was financed through direct out-of-pocket payment in the form of 
hospital fees (user fees) in the colonial era (Arhinful 2003). This however restricted access to 
modern health care services to only a small number of colonial elite and urban dwellers 
(Arhin-Tenkorang 2000, McIntyre et al. 2008). 
The first post-colonial government in 1957, rooted in a socialist ideological orientation, 
however, introduced “free health care” for all Ghanaians at all public health facilities. This 
was done through the removal of user fees so that health care was virtually fully financed 
from tax revenue and donor funding (Nyonator, Kutzin 1999, Ramachandra, Hsiao 2007). 
The objective of the government was to remove financial barriers to access and provide 
financial protection against catastrophic health expenditure for all Ghanaians. This could be 
described as the first attempt in the history of Ghana at achieving universal financial 
protection through the implementation of a predominantly tax-based prepayment system.   
However, there was no specific dedicated allocation of tax revenue for health care and as a 















(MOH 2004). Hence, upon the overthrow of the socialist government in 1966, coupled with 
the onset of economic recession in the 1970s, it became increasingly difficult to sustain a 
purely tax-funded health care system. 
By the early 1970s therefore, nominal user fees were introduced in public health facilities as a 
way of limiting “unnecessary use”. However, an increased severity of economic stagnation 
which led to the adoption of a World Bank and IMF Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
in 1983 led to the introduction of high user fees at the point of service, famously known as 
the “cash and carry” system in 1985 as an attempt to recover at least 15% of recurrent 
expenditure on health care (Agyepong, Adjei 2008). Though MOH (2001) reports that the 
financial aim of the policy was attained, it resulted in inequities in access to health care; a 
decline in utilisation of services by about two-thirds and an increase in self-medication 
(Asenso-Okyere et al. 1998). Though exemptions from the payment of user fees were 
introduced for the very poor and other vulnerable groups, such exemptions were not 
effectively implemented (Nyonator, Kutzin 1999, MOH 2004, Nyonator et al. 1996, 
Garshong et al. 2001). The introduction of user fees (OOP) therefore meant that the poor no 
longer had financial protection against the cost of health care and hence were very vulnerable 
to catastrophic health care expenditure. 
This again led to the search for an alternative financing mechanism that would guarantee poor 
households financial protection against health care spending at the time of using services.  
The only financing mechanism that had not yet been tested on a large scale in Ghana by then 
was contributory health insurance. In the 1990s, therefore, several community-based health 
insurance schemes (CBHIS) emerged in an attempt to replace out-of-pocket payment for 
health care (Sulzbach 2008). The Nkoranza Health Insurance Scheme introduced in 1992, a 















groups such as cocoa farmers which was abandoned by 1999, and the Dangme West CBHIS 
introduced in 2000 were among the popular schemes of the 1990s (Agyepong, Adjei 2008). 
The often cited constraints of these schemes were that they covered only about 1% of the 
Ghanaian population (Atim et al. 2001) and hence the risk pools were limited and 
fragmented. This basically threatened the sustainability of the CBHIS. However, their 
existence served as an experimental basis for testing the feasibility of attaining universal 
coverage through contributory health insurance. 
As Ghanaians approached another democratic political election in 2000, the major challenge 
to health care financing remained how to ensure that all Ghanaians have access to affordable 
health care in an equitable, efficient and sustainable manner. This issue became central to the 
political campaigns of the then opposition New Patriotic Party (NPP) as it promised to offer 
all Ghanaians universal access to affordable health care through the introduction of a health 
care financing system that would replace the regressive “cash-and-carry” system should it be 
voted into power. To deliver on its election campaign promise, the NPP government of 
Ghana that won the 2000 general elections took a bold step towards achieving universal 
coverage by introducing a mandatory National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) to replace 
out-of-pocket payments for health care (MOH 2004). 
1.3 The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) of Ghana 
The National Health Insurance Scheme of Ghana, the first of its kind in Sub-Saharan Africa, 
was established by the National Health Insurance Act, 2003 ( Act 650 ) and launched in 2004 
by the Government of Ghana (MOH 2004, Government of Ghana 2003). With the goal of 
providing equitable and universal access to health care for all Ghanaians, the scheme was 
designed to incorporate both the formal and informal sectors by fusing both elements of a 















legislation made it possible for the operation of three types of insurance schemes in order to 
offer all Ghanaians the opportunity to belong to the one of their choice (GHS 2004). These 
are: District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (DMHIS) in all the 145 districts of Ghana; 
Private Mutual Health Insurance (PMHI) and Private Commercial Insurance Schemes 
(PCIS). It is however, only the DMHIS that are entitled to government subsidies. The 
DMHIS are district-based and each covers informal sector workers, formal sector employees 
and indigents. The National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) was established to regulate 
and coordinate the operations of the various components of the scheme. 
In terms of resource mobilisation, the scheme reflects a mixed system of contributory 
insurance and tax-based funding. It is funded from the following sources.  First is annual 
premium contributions from informal sector workers and those formal sector employees who 
are not covered under the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) pension 
scheme. The contributions are supposed to be structured from GH¢ 7.20 for the lower to GH¢ 
48 for the higher socio-economic groups respectively (McIntyre et al. 2008, D’Almeida, 
Durairaj & Kirigia 2010). However, because of difficulties in assessing household income 
levels, many DMHIS have fixed the premium at a flat rate. All children less than 18 years of 
age, indigents (poor), elderly (70+), and formal sector SSNIT contributors and pensioners are 
exempted from these premium payments (Agyepong, Adjei 2008, Asenso-Boadi, Agbeibor 
2010). Second, is a 2.5% National Health Insurance Levy (NHIL), a form of indirect tax 
placed on the same goods and services that are affected by VAT (McIntyre et al. 2008). With 
the imposition of this levy, VAT has increased from 12.5% to 15%.  Third is a 2.5% 
deduction from the SSNIT contributions of formal sector workers.  In Ghana, most formal 
sector workers and their employers contribute on a monthly basis, 17.5% of the employee’s 















It is from this fund that a monthly deduction equivalent to 2.5% of each employee’s salary is 
made to the NHIS. The deductions are compulsory and hence no SSNIT contributor can opt 
out of the system.  The other sources of funds are: allocations from general tax revenue, 
donor funds, interest from investments and once-off registration fees paid by all NHIS 
members (GHS 2004). The informal sector premiums are collected by each DMHIS, the NHI 
levy is collected by the VAT Secretariat and SSNIT collects the formal sector contributions 
in the form of payroll deductions. 
With regard to pooling, the informal sector’s premium goes directly into the accounts of each 
DMHIS while the other sources of funds are deposited into a National Health Insurance Fund 
(NHIF) which is meant to play a risk equalisation and cross subsidisation role for the 
DMHIS. However, what this Fund has done since its inception is only to transfer the 
contribution of the formal sector members to their respective DMHIS and government funds 
for the subsidisation of informal sector contributions and  indigents (McIntyre et al. 2008).  
As at June 2010, the scheme had registered almost 70% of the total population of Ghana 
(NHIA 2010b), but by 2009 only 50% of the Ghanaian population had valid NHI 
membership ID cards (MOH 2010). By implication, therefore, about half of Ghanaians still 
have to pay out-of-pocket for health care and hence are not financially protected against 
health care expenditure.  
Services are secured by insured clients via an NHIS member ID card, which is renewed every 
year. Insured clients are provided with “free” health care from those government, faith-based 
and private commercial hospitals, health centres and pharmacies that are accredited by the 
NHIS. Fee-for-service is the mechanism used to pay for drugs and some other services while 
hospitals are paid via DRGs on the basis of claims made by them to the DMHIS (McIntyre et 















(NHIA 2010b). The benefit package covers the full cost of inpatient and outpatient services, 
essential drugs (on the NHI drug list), maternity care (antenatal care (ANC) and delivery), 
emergency care and eye care (MOH 2004). This covers about 80% to 90% of the total disease 
burden of Ghana, and what is not covered constitutes the disease burden of the wealthiest 
class, which are usually very expensive to treat (Agyepong, Adjei 2008).  
The steady increase in enrolment into the scheme over the years and its contribution to 
increasing  utilisation of health services have put the scheme on the pathway towards the 
realisation of universal financial protection (MOH 2009). However, prominent among the 
challenges associated with the scheme is how to ensure that it becomes completely 
sustainable, efficient and benefits all Ghanaians equitably. This is because the informal sector 
of the Ghanaian economy is relatively large and enrolment in the scheme and premiums 
collected from this sector are currently low and there is no mechanism in place to ensure the 
sustainability of informal sector enrolment since membership is renewable and premiums 
paid annually (Gyapong et al. 2007). It has also been demonstrated that the premiums paid by 
the informal sector are regressive and indigents are difficult to identify for exemption 
(Akazili 2010) thereby defeating the pro-poor purpose of the scheme. The poor are therefore 
often left out of the scheme and hence do not benefit equitably from government subsidies for 
health care. In addition, the administrative cost of collecting these informal sector premiums 
usually results in very small net revenue returns from premiums which raise issues of 
efficiency in generating NHIS revenue from the informal sector (MOH 2009). 
The sustainability of the scheme and its ability to achieve universal coverage therefore 
depend largely on the extent to which these premium-related problems within the informal 
sector are addressed. Addressing these problems could take the form of maintaining the 















the entire NHIS system to fund coverage of informal sector purely from tax revenue (Akazili 
2010). It was, therefore, against this background that in an attempt to restructure the NHIS, 
the current NDC government proposed the introduction of a one-time premium payment for 
the informal sector. The proposed one-time payment policy can therefore be seen as an 
attempt at a further development of the NHIS towards universal coverage. Its major focus 
however is on universal financial protection. This is because although the proposed policy 
has relevance for the universal access component of universal coverage, a whole range of 
other interventions such as the provision of health facilities and deployment of staff close to 
patients are required as well to achieve universal access (WHO 2010). 
1. 4. The proposed one-time premium payment (OTPP) policy 
It must be noted that, this one-time premium payment policy is a component of a 
comprehensive health care package promised to Ghanaians in the party’s 2008 election 
Manifesto which reads “The NDC Government will implement a Universal Health Insurance 
Scheme which will reflect the universal contribution of all Ghanaian residents to the Scheme. 
Our universal Health Insurance scheme will guarantee access to free health care in all public 
health institutions. It will be listed in the health insurance schedule, will not be district-
specific and will allow for one time premium payment for registration with the scheme.....” 
(NDC Manifesto 2008:68). Though the content of the proposed OTPP policy is not yet clear 
to the general public, speculation among Ghanaians is that it would either take the form of 
scrapping informal sector contributions so that public health care services would be totally 
funded from tax revenue, which seems to be in line with the NDC manifesto, or they would 
have to pay the net present value of all future contributions as a single payment during 















2. Problem statement 
The NDC government has indicated its commitment to the formulation and implementation 
of the one-time premium payment (OTPP) policy as a way of achieving universal coverage 
through national health insurance (NHIA 2010b, MOH 2009, NHIA 2010a). It is however not 
yet clear whether various stakeholders are likely to support or oppose this one-time premium 
policy. How strong the support or opposition to the policy would be and how that would 
impact on the feasibility of implementing the policy has not been established. There is 
therefore a need to investigate the positions, interest, power and potential influence of various 
stakeholders with regard to this policy so as to contribute to assessing the feasibility of the 
policy. 
Also, the 2009 Independent Health Sector Review reported that “in terms of perception, the 
switch to a one‐time payment is likely to alter the view of the NHIS as an insurance 
approach. It would then be seen as a tax‐based system for funding curative care (using a 
third party payment mechanism), with some additional contributions from formal sector 
workers” (MOH 2009:62). This also indicates a need to examine stakeholders’ understanding 
of what a one-time premium payment policy is all about. This is because stakeholders’ 
support or opposition to the policy are likely to be informed by their understanding of the 
policy. 
Though the policy idea is currently under consideration within the NHIA, their focus is on 
assessing its long term economic implications (MOH 2009), optimal premium levels and 
other technicalities. However, over-emphasis on technical content, design and economic 
implications as justifications for a policy often leads to neglect of the policy process, socio-
political context and actor dynamics within which the content would be implemented (Walt, 















often been cited as responsible for lack of policy implementation and failure of many policies 
to achieve their designed goals.  This is because a sound technical analysis is not enough 
justification for adopting a policy (Thomas, Gilson 2004) since it is not a guarantee that 
various stakeholders would support its implementation. The feasibility of a technically well 
designed and economically sustainable policy could therefore be brought into question 
through a stakeholder analysis. For instance, a stakeholder analysis conducted on a women 
and child health programme in India after its design revealed considerable lack of agreement 
between the funder and government officials and hence the policy was deemed not feasible 
for implementation and it was therefore recommended that it should be abandoned (Kumar, 
Chaudhury & Vasadev 1997).  
This study therefore seeks to contribute information to assess the feasibility of formulating 
and implementing the one-time premium payment policy by exploring the views/perceptions 
of various stakeholders on the policy and assessing their positions, interest, concerns, power 
and potential influence on the policy through a stakeholder analysis.  This will highlight the 
potential prospects and challenges for the formulation and implementation of the policy and 
hence its potential impact on achieving the goal of universal coverage. 
3. Rationale for the study 
Health financing reforms such as introducing a one-time payment NHIS policy are often 
contentious since they involve decisions about who pays for, and who benefits from health 
care (Thomas, Gilson 2004). Also, when it comes to issues of social policy of the state, 
Ghanaians often differ in opinions largely along political lines but sometimes also along 
technical and professional lines (Agyepong, Adjei 2008). As a political initiative therefore, 
the one-time premium policy is currently the most socially and politically controversial issue 















administrative and local concerns are therefore bound to be (or are being) raised by various 
stakeholders with regard to the feasibility of the policy.  Conducting a stakeholder analysis at 
this preparatory stage of the policy is therefore very relevant as it would indicate the views of 
various stakeholders on the policy that should be taken into account in finalising and 
implementing the policy and hence help to build into the policy actions that could secure 
actors’ support.  On the other hand, it will also indicate the extent of opposition, what the 
concerns are, the powers of the opponents, and hence will assist policy-makers in assessing 
whether these concerns can be addressed to promote more support for the policy or whether it 
would be unfeasible to implement it. The study would also add to the existing literature on 
feasible options of achieving universal coverage within low-and middle-income countries 
(LMIC). Other LMICs attempting to introduce universal coverage reforms can therefore 
make use of the outcome of this study to inform them on which options may be feasible 
within a developing country context.  
4. Research aim and objectives of the study 
4.1. Aim  
The goal of this study is to undertake a stakeholder analysis of the proposed one-time NHIS 
premium payment policy in Ghana. 
4.2. Objectives 
1. To assess the understanding of key stakeholders  of  the proposed one-time premium 
payment policy 
2. To examine the interest, positions, power and potential influence of key stakeholders 
in  terms of the policy and the reasons for their support or opposition 
3. To explore the prospects and challenges for the implementation of a one-time 















4. To draw lessons from the study to inform further steps towards the formulation and 
implementation of the policy and future universal coverage reforms in Ghana and 
other LMICs 
5.  A brief literature review for building a conceptual framework for the study 
This section contains a brief review of conceptual literature on policy analysis for the purpose 
of building a conceptual framework for the study. A detailed review is provided in the next 
part of this dissertation (structured literature review).  
Policy analysis is what guides universal coverage reforms toward the realisation of policy 
goals (Gilson et al. forthcoming). Analysis of policy reforms can be done retrospectively to 
generate knowledge to aid the understanding of a past reform experience or prospectively to 
aid the implementation of a proposed policy or to inform future policy reforms (Walt, Gilson 
1994). Empirical observation however reveals that proper policy analyses within low-and 
middle-income settings, especially prospective analyses, are limited (Gilson, Raphaely 2008). 
 In presenting a framework for policy analysis, Walt & Gilson (1994) argued that the 
outcome of a policy process towards the realisation of policy goals is determined by the 
interaction of the policy’s content, context, process and actors. In their triangular framework, 
actors, referred to as stakeholders in this study, are at the centre of this interaction. This study 
is basically a stakeholder analysis and therefore focuses on understanding the actors’ 
component of the Walt and Gilson (1994) analytical framework.  The study deals with actors 
and their likely reactions to potential policy content and process within the Ghanaian context. 
Also, the principles of feasibility, equity, efficiency and sustainability have been identified as 
useful criteria for assessing the relative merits of health care financing reforms (McIntyre 















policy context, content, process as well as actor dynamics. The feasibility of a policy, which 
usually deals with the availability of adequate administrative capacity and the level of 
stakeholder support or opposition to the implementation of the policy, is what has been 
reported to have often been neglected in health policy analysis (McIntyre 2007, Walt, Gilson 
1994, Thomas, Gilson 2004). A stakeholder analysis contributes to determining the feasibility 
of policy change through an analysis that focuses on the influences or potential influences of 
stakeholder characteristics and dynamics on the formulation and/or implementation of the 
reform (Brugha, Varvasovszky 2000). Stakeholder characteristics used in this study refers to 
stakeholders’ understanding of the policy issue, their interest/concerns, (potential) positions, 
powers and potential influences over the policy formulation and/or implementation and its 
overall success. A detailed description of stakeholder characteristics is provided in the 
structured literature review. 
6. Conceptual framework  
Drawing from the above review, this study is premised on the conceptual reasoning that 
various characteristics of stakeholders would determine the kind of influence they will have 
on the proposed policy and the nature of their influence will have implications for the 
implementation of the policy and its potential impact on the realisation of the policy’s goals 
and objectives. In relation to stakeholders’ characteristics, the study postulates that, 
stakeholders’ understanding of the policy issue will affect their interest in it and their interest 
will influence their positions on the policy and drawing on the power they possess, they will 
exert influences on the formulation and/or implementation of the policy (see Figure 1).  In an 
attempt to influence policy, stakeholders usually draw on their interactions with the content, 
context and process of the policy. These variables, though they are not the main focus of the 
study, are therefore essential in making judgements about stakeholder interest and power 















that stakeholders are likely to have on the implementation process of the policy will affect the 
feasibility of implementing it. Establishing the feasibility of implementing the policy would 
then bring out the prospects and challenges likely to be faced during implementation in 
relation to achieving its immediate objective of universal financial protection. However, since 
the ultimate goal of the proposed one-time premium payment policy is to attain universal 
coverage, the interaction between guaranteed universal financial protection and universal 
access to needed services is required to facilitate the realisation of universal coverage.  But, 
since other complementary interventions are needed as well for universal access to be 
realised, the access component of universal coverage will not be considered in detail in this 
study and has therefore been de-emphasised in the conceptual framework.  As a stakeholder 
analysis therefore, this study mainly focuses on the analysis of the stakeholders’ 
characteristics and their potential influence on the formulation and/or implementation of the 
policy. However, implications for the feasibility of formulating and/ implementing the policy 















Figure1: Conceptual Framework for analysing the potential influence of stakeholders on the one-time NHIS payment policy in Ghana
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7.1. Research setting 
The study will be conducted in Ghana: specifically in Accra the national capital, and in the 
Akuapim South and Kassena-Nankana West districts.  Ghana is a former British colony 
located in sub-Saharan Africa. Ghana gained her independence in 1957. After the overthrow 
of the first post-colonial civilian government in 1966 through a military coup d’état, the 
country was faced with a long period of political instability due to frequent changes in 
government between civilian and military regimes. However, since 1992 Ghana has operated 
a multiparty democratic system, with elections often keenly contested between the two main 
political parties (NDC and NPP), and victories sometimes determined through run-offs 
(second round of voting). The NDC ruled from 1992 to 2000, the NPP from 2001 to 2008 and 
the NDC returned to power in 2009 through a marginal victory over the NPP in the 2008 
presidential run-off election. The NDC has a centre-left ideological leaning while that of the 
NPP is centre-right (Agyepong, Adjei 2008). 
The country has a population of about 24 million (24,223,431) with a sex ratio of 95 males 
per 100 females and an annual inter-censual population growth rate declining from 2.7% in 
2000 to 2.4%  in 2010 (GSS 2011). About half of the Ghanaian population is under 15 years 
and by implication constitutes part of the exempt group of the NHIS (GSS 2005).  As at 
2000, the urban population across the 10 regions was 44% with the southern sector relatively 
more urbanised than the north (GSS 2005).  
In 2010, Ghana was declared as a lower-middle-income country by the Ghana Statistical 
Service. Until then (2010), the country had a GDP growth rate of about 6.8% (in 2008) and a 
fluctuating inflation rate that recently peaked at 20% in 2008 (MOH 2009) though the 
inflation rate is currently estimated to be at a single digit level. The per capita expenditure on 















recommendation of US$30-40 (MOH 2007). The overall government budgetary allocation to 
the health sector is about 12% which falls below the Abuja target of 15% for African 
countries (Jones, Ahadzie & Doh 2008, AU 2006).   
There exists a dominant public health sector with private providers constituting about 35% 
(Results for Development Institute, Adjei 2010). Generally, health facilities and personnel are 
inadequate in relation to the population that is being served. There are about 1,439 health 
facilities serving about 24 million residents and the average distance that must be travelled to 
consult a doctor is about 16km (Salisu, Prinz 2009). The doctor to population ratio is about 
1:11,649 and that of nurses to the population is 1:1,172 (MOH 2010). Also, geographic 
disparities exist in the distribution of providers with rural areas having less access to modern 
health care facilities. It is reported that about 43% of all doctors are practicing in Greater 
Accra while the 3 northern regions have only 4% (MOH 2010). Also, over 60% of all formal 
health care facilities are located in the urban areas though primary health care is much 
emphasised in Ghana (Akazili 2010). 
 Malaria and upper respiratory diseases top the disease burden of Ghana with pregnancy 
related complications also being quite high. Maternal mortality is around 995 per 100,000 
live births (GHS 2007) while the infant mortality rate is about 80 per 1,000 live births (GHS 
2009). Also, Ghana was ranked 32nd of 194 countries in 2008 in terms of the under 5 
mortality rate (UNICEF 2008). Life expectancy in Ghana is below 60 years (56 for males and 
58 for females). 
The Akuapim South district is located in the eastern region. It is one of the urban districts and 
is also located in the southern part of Ghana. It is located close to the national capital, Accra, 
and hence the views from this district may not differ significantly from the views of other 















a district hospital and one of the oldest National Health Insurance DMHIS, which are located 
in Nsawam, the district capital.  The Kassena-Nankana West District (KNWD) is one of the 
newly established districts in the Upper East Region. The Upper East region is one of the 
three regions in Northern Ghana. The KNWD is largely rural. Unlike the Akuapim South 
district, the Kassena-Nankana West district has no district hospital and no national health 
insurance office of its own. The Kassena-Nankana East DMHIS, located in Navrongo also 
provides NHIS services to residents of the KNWD, whose capital is Paga. While there are 
medical doctors in the Akuapim South district hospital, there is no doctor in any of the health 
facilities in the KNWD. The views that will be gathered from this district may therefore not 
differ significantly from the views of other rural dwellers in other parts of the country, 
especially the northern part. The rural/urban logic as applied in the sampling is important 
because, in Ghana, residents of urban areas generally have a greater ability to pay for 
insurance than rural areas. Since the OTPP is likely to affect the amount to be paid for 
insurance, the rural population is likely to respond differently to it from the urban population. 
7.2. Study design 
This is a qualitative cross-sectional study exploring the opinions of various stakeholders on 
the proposed one-time NHIS premium payment policy in Ghana. A qualitative design is more 
appropriate for this study as it offers a better opportunity to explore the opinions, concerns, 
expectations, possible contradictory behaviours and such intangible issues as power relations 
and influence of various stakeholders with regard to the proposed policy (Mack et al. 2005). 
The greater flexibility that a qualitative research design offers would provide an opportunity 
for probing to gain an in-depth understanding of stakeholder dynamics.  
7.3. Population and sampling 
The target population for this study is all stakeholders who would have an interest in the 















health sector, local or international, who it has been established have often shown interest in 
health financing reforms in Ghana, are targeted in this study. Since the aim is not to achieve 
statistical representativeness as is often the case with purely quantitative research (Joubert, 
Ehrlich 2007) but to explore a wide range of views of various stakeholders, the selection 
criteria would be purposive (Mack et al. 2005, Silverman 2006). With the focus of the study 
being at the national level, study participants will be included to ensure that the results of the 
study will reflect the views of both rural and urban dwellers across the northern and southern 
sections of the country. As a result, although most of the key stakeholders would be selected 
from the national capital, two districts (one rural and from the north and the other urban and 
in the south) will be selected for detailed community-level studies through FGDs with 
beneficiaries and interviews with district-level and frontline implementers of the policy.  The 

















 Table1: Proposed stakeholders to be considered in the study 
Stakeholder category Organisation/Departments Specific stakeholder No. 
Policy drivers (authorisers) 
Government of Ghana, Ministry of Health  
 
National Health Insurance Authority  
 
Minister of Health and/or deputy,  
 





Staff of Ministry of Health 
 
Staff of the NHIA 
 
Staff of Ghana Health service  ( national) 
Ministry of Finance 
 
Directors and heads of relevant 








Politicians and Legislators 




Parliamentary select committee on Health  
 
Leaders or members of Parliament (MPs) 
 
Minority spokesperson on Health and/or 
party leaders 




Opinion leaders, academics and health 
researchers  
 
Directors and/or former Directors of  




Labour organisations and Unions 
Trade Union Congress (TUC), Ghana Medical 
Association, Ghana Registered  Nurses 






Donors and  international collaborators  Country representatives 2 
Frontline Implementers 
Staff of DMHIS 
Staff of Ghana Health service  
 
Street-level bureaucrats 
Managers of DMHIS, Accountants, claims 
managers 
Hospital administrators, public 
pharmacist, Accountant 







Total  31  
Beneficiaries  
SSNIT contributors (formal sector) 
Community level ( informal sector) 
Teachers: 2 FGDs one in each District( 8-
12 members each) 






7.4 Recruitment of study participants 
All sampled stakeholders for the semi-structured interviews will initially be contacted 
through a telephone call to inform them about the study and to ask them to arrange time for 
the interviews. Where contact with participants on phone is not possible, the principal 















purpose of the study and seek permission for the interviews.  Each participant will be 
presented with an introductory letter from the PI’s supervisor/UCT. A snowballing technique 
will also be relied upon to identify the less visible stakeholders for inclusion into the study 
(Mack et al. 2005). For FGDs, the principal investigator will liaise with community-level 
gatekeepers through appropriate community entry processes to recruit participants.  
7.5. Methods of data collection 
In order to be able to appropriately capture a wide range of information from different 
stakeholders and as a way of methodological triangulation to improve upon the credibility of 
the study (Mack et al. 2005, Silverman 2006), three data collection techniques will be used in 
this study. These are: face-to-face semi-structured interviews to be administered to the 
national-level policy actors and district-level policy implementers outlined in Table 1 above, 
a review of documents in the public domain such as newspapers and parliamentary debates 
on the one-time payment policy and focus group discussions (FGDs) to be organised at the 
community-level for beneficiaries. The semi-structured interviews will enable me to explore 
the opinions of the individual key stakeholders and that of their organisations on the proposed 
policy (Giacomini, Cook 2000) although the major limitation of this approach is that the 
individual stakeholders’ opinion may not be a true representation of that of his/her 
organisation. 
Six separate FGDs, three in each selected district, will be organised for informal sector 
beneficiaries (comprising both registered and non-registered NHI premium contributors) and 
for the formal sector (SSNIT contributors). For the formal sector, teachers constitute the 
majority of SNNIT contributors in Ghana and can be organised more easily than those in 
other formal sector employment and hence one FGD comprising teachers and two community 
level FGDs, one each for men and women will be organised in each district. The size of each 















examining the opinions of beneficiaries as a social group but group dynamics within FGDs 
will stimulate conversation, reactions and hence stakeholders (beneficiaries) will influence 
each other through their presence and their reactions to the extent that each person can raise 
issues that s/he would not have revealed under a different setting and condition. However, it 
is usually more difficult to facilitate processes in focus groups than interviews and hence it 
will require greater effort and facilitating skills to handle the FGDs (Mack et al. 2005).   
 Because of the difficulty in contacting all stakeholders for interviews and FGDs, a review of 
documents in the public domain will help to reveal information on their positions on and 
concerns about the policy. The interview guides (three different versions), the FGDs guide 
and a secondary data extraction sheet are attached as an appendix. 
7.6. Data collection processes and management 
Each semi-structured stakeholder interview is expected to last a maximum of 60 minutes, but 
the FGDs will be between 60 to 90 minutes each. The data from the interviews and FGDs 
will be captured by taking down notes and tape recording after obtaining consent. Two 
research assistants (RAs) will be employed to assist in note taking for the FGDs, but the 
semi-structured interviews will solely be administered by the principal researcher. With the 
exception of community-level FGDs, which will be done in the local languages of the two 
districts, all interviews and FGDs will be done in English since the target population speak 
English.  Space will be provided in the semi-structured interview guides for recording of 
responses, but tape recording will be done as well where consent is granted. Notes taken by 
the assistant researchers and the principal researcher (PI) will be compared and compiled 
immediately after FGDs. Tapes will be played and listened to by the principal researcher and 
key portions of the tape-recorded interview data will be transcribed. However, data from all 
FGDs will be transcribed and translated before analysis. A data extraction sheet will be used 















handled and managed by the principal researcher and all used and unused data collection 
instruments will be securely stored under the care of the principal investigator and they will 
be destroyed with the tapes after the whole research process. An external hard drive will be 
purchased to serve the sole purpose of a computer backup device for the data that will be 
gathered through this study. 
7.7. Analysis and presentation of data 
Qualitative data analytical tools and techniques will be used for the analysis and presentation 
of the data. Thematic analysis will be used to analysis interview notes and FGD transcripts 
while a document analysis will be undertaken for data from documentary sources. A coding 
frame comprising both deductive (derived from the conceptual framework) and inductive 
codes will be developed to guide the analysis. Specific stakeholder analysis tools such as 
force-field analysis, stakeholder matrix, tables, boxes, charts and position maps will be used 
for the analysis and presentation of stakeholder characteristics. Microsoft excel will be used 
to develop the spreadsheets for the analysis of stakeholder characteristics.  The unit of 
analysis is that of the group level and hence, the various stakeholder categories as outlined in 
Table 1 will be considered as the analytical units for this study (Weible 2006). 
 8. Ensuring quality in the study 
Since this stakeholder analysis will elicit the opinions of stakeholders, care must be taken in 
order not to introduce the biases of the investigator in presenting the opinions of respondents 
(Mack et al. 2005). To improve upon the credibility of the study therefore, a triangulation of 
methods and sources of data is proposed. Three different methods, namely: interviews, FGDs 
and document reviews will be used to collect data in a way that the strengths of one 
complements for the weakness of the others. Also, the interest, positions and concerns of 
stakeholders on the policy will be explored from their own opinions as well as the opinions of 















improve upon the validity of the data collected. Also, the study seeks to enforce intra-coder 
reliability through repeated coding by the principal researcher. Multiple means of capturing 
data, through note-taking by three investigators and tape recording at the same time will also 
enhance the reliability of the study. Instruments that have already been formulated and used 
for stakeholder analysis such as the guideline provided by Schmeer (2000) and the checklist 
used in the SAZA project in South Africa and Zambia (Gilson, Antezana & Bennett 2000, 
Gilson et al. 2003) were consulted in the design of the interviews and FGD guides for this 
study. 
9. Ethical issues 
There will be very minimal risks of participating in this study.  However, since the questions 
are about stakeholders’ opinions on the policy, I acknowledge that if the participants have 
negative opinions of the policy and the study makes known these to the policy drivers or 
government, it may result into victimisation at the work place (if they are a staff/employee of 
MOH/NHIA) or it may damage the relationship between the stakeholder organisation and the 
government.  The study however seeks to address this by ensuring that all information 
gathered from the interviews and FGDs are treated confidentially and the findings will be 
presented in a way that individuals/organisations will not be identified by names with their 
opinions unless these views have been made public (such as materials quoted in the media, 
record of parliamentary debates etc.). There are however, no anticipated major psychological 
or physical stresses of participating in this study except that participants may have to forgo 
other activities in order to participate in the study. As an appreciation for participants’ time, 
lunch will be provided during FGDs and the transportation cost incurred to travel to the 
venues for FGDs will be reimbursed to participants. 
As regards benefits from participation, there are no direct material benefits from participating 















Insurance Authority to assist in finalizing the policy, the study offers stakeholders a potential 
platform to make known their opinions on the proposed policy issue. If concerns raised by 
stakeholders are taken into account by the policy drivers, it will increase the possibility of 
coming out with a health insurance policy that will be widely accepted by Ghanaians. Hence, 
participation in this study offers wider benefits to the Ghanaian society.  
Participation in this study will be entirely voluntary and participants have the option not to 
participate or to discontinue their participation without any adverse consequence. All 
participants will therefore be asked to freely consent to the study.  In obtaining informed 
consent, participants will be given sufficient and relevant information about the study to 
enable them to choose voluntarily whether to take part or not. Written informed consent 
forms will be given to participants to sign or thumb print. Two versions of the consent forms 
will be used: one for interviews and the other for FGDs (see appendix for details). The 
consent forms for stakeholder interviews will be in English but that for community-level 
FGDs will be translated into the local language where the participant does not understand 
English. Informed consent will be obtained by the principal investigator and for community-
level FDGs, a translator will assist in obtaining informed consent. Also tape recording will 
only be done if consent/permission to record is granted.  
10. Personnel and Logistics 
The data collection is expected to last for a period of two-months, thus from the 20th of 
November to the 20th of January, 2010. The principal investigator (PI) and two research 
assistants (RAs) will be responsible for the implementation of this protocol. The principal 
investigator will be responsible for the recruitment and a brief orientation of the research 
assistants, for conducting all semi-structured stakeholder interviews as well as facilitating all 
FGDs for SSNIT contributors and some of the community-level FGDs in the Kassena-















(the local language of the Akuapem South district) will facilitate the community-level FGDs 
in that district and the other who should be fluent in Nankam will also facilitate the 
community-level FGDs in the Kassena-Nankana West District. The RAs will have a 
minimum qualification of a bachelor degree and their main task will be to assist in 
organising, documenting and compiling proceedings from the FGDs. The PI will be the main 
coordinator of the whole research process and with the support of his supervisor he will be 
the sole analyst of the data. The main expenditure items in this study include: Salaries and 
wages of RAs, accommodation and transportation for the three researchers, telephone 
calls/emailing/faxing, printing and photocopying, tape recorders, purchase of a memory stick, 
stationery, lunch and reimbursement of transport costs for participants of FGDs and 
transcription of FGDs. The detailed description of each of the expenditure items and the 
corresponding cost can be found in the budget attached as an appendix. 
11. Write-up and dissemination 
The potential users of the results from this study are the NHIA, academic researchers and all 
the stakeholders who are targeted in this study. The write-up and dissemination of the results 
from this study will therefore be done in a way that will be suitable for the consumption of all 
these various potential beneficiaries. A copy of the final dissertation will be presented to the 
NHIA. A journal manuscript targeted for publication in a peer reviewed journal will be for 
the consumption of policy makers and the academic community. Lastly, an editorial 
commentary (opinion piece) will serve to inform health insurance policy makers within 
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Part B: Structured literature review  
(Word count= 10,306 excluding references and the 2 tables)  
1. Introduction 
The aim of this literature review is to provide a conceptual and empirical foundation for the 
study. It is divided into two main sections. The first section contains a review of conceptual 
and empirical literature on the concept of universal coverage and particularly universal 
financial protection which is the objective of the proposed one-time premium payment 
(OTPP) policy. Particular attention has been paid to specific examples of universal coverage 
reforms within low- and middle-income countries (LMICs) and the Ghanaian policy context 
of recent reforms aimed at achieving universal financial protection. The second section 
presents a review of conceptual literature on stakeholder characteristics and analysis which is 
the approach used for this study, and empirical literature on actor dynamics with regard to 
recent health care financing reforms within LMICs.  
Both print and electronic resources were accessed through hand searching of journals, books, 
policy documents and internet searches of Google Scholar, Pubmed, Inter-Science (Wiley), 
Science Direct (Elsevier), Google, WHO website, Ghana Government website, and the 
National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) website.  The following key search terms were 
combined in various different ways: Health (care) financing, universal coverage, universal 
health care, (universal) financial protection, social health insurance, tax-based health care 
financing, national health insurance, health (care) financing reforms, health insurance 
policies/reforms, (health) policy analysis, stakeholder analysis, one-time insurance premium, 
informal sector, (non) formal sector, low- and middle-come countries (LMICs), developing 















2. Universal coverage  
2.1. Background and meaning of the concept 
Universal coverage (UC) has been internationally acknowledged as the ultimate goal of 
sustainable health care financing systems (WHO 2011, WHO 2010, WHO 2005b, WHO 
2008a). It was initially proposed and accepted as a goal to be pursued by all member states of 
the WHO at its 2005 World Health Assembly and was declared one of the four pillars of 
primary health care in the 2008 World Health Assembly (WHO 2008a). It was the focus of 
the 2010 World Health Report and the WHO continues to call on all its member states to 
adopt health care financing systems that lead to universal coverage (WHO 2011, WHO 
2010). Moving towards universal coverage is therefore currently the focus of health care 
financing reforms in most countries (WHO 2010). 
Universal coverage means the existence of a health system that provides all residents with 
equitable access to suitable and affordable health care according to the health care needs of 
the residents (Carrin, James 2004). It has tw  different but interlinked components: universal 
financial protection and equitable access to needed health services for all residents (WHO 
2010, Kuzin 2007, McIntyre, Kutzin 2010). The equitable access component implies that all 
residents of a country should be able to obtain access to both personal and non-personal 
health services that are needed by them (WHO 2008a, Evans 2007) and the service package 
must be adequate to cover their preventive, curative, rehabilitative and health promotional 
needs (WHO 2010, Carrin, James 2004). This review focuses predominantly on financing 
mechanisms for achieving universal financial protection and hence universal coverage, with 
specific emphasis on the context of low- and middle-income countries. 
2. 2.  The concept of universal financial protection 
Universal financial protection refers to the shielding of all individuals or households against 















Tenkorang 2000, Kutzin 2000). It implies that citizens should not be required to make 
(substantial) out-of-pocket payments for health care at the point of service provision that 
could have catastrophic consequences (WHO 2010). Catastrophic consequences of health 
care expenditure refers to the situation whereby a household spends a certain proportion of its 
income on out-of-pocket expenditure on health care which eventually throws such household 
into (or deeper into) poverty (Arhin-Tenkorang 2000, Glaser 1991, Xu 2003, McIntyre 2006). 
Household health care expenditure exceeding either 10% of total household income or 40% 
to 50% of household income remaining after meeting basic consumption needs such as food 
and shelter is considered catastrophic (Xu et al. 2006, Ranson 2002, Russell 2005). The 
argument for universal financial protection is therefore premised on the basis that uncertainty 
in the timing and cost of illness often leads households into catastrophic health care 
expenditure (Evans 2007, Arhin-Tenkorang 2000). Hence, prepayment systems funded from 
taxes and insurance contributions have been advocated for the realisation of universal 
financial protection (WHO 2010, WHO 2005b). 
2.3. Basic requirements for universal financial protection  
The move towards universal financial protection requires that health care expenditure is 
largely or wholly financed through a progressive prepayment mechanism within an effective 
system of integrated risk and resource pooling (WHO 2010, WHO 2005b, McIntyre, Kutzin 
2010, Evans 2007). Prepayment systems “are based on payments made in advance of an 
illness, pooled in some way and used to fund health services for everyone who is covered” 
(WHO 2010:12). As a requirement for universal financial protection, the rich (the relatively 
better off) should pay a higher percentage of their income to the prepaid fund than the poor 
(relatively worse-off). There should therefore be no caps such as upper limits on the amounts 
people contribute to the pooled fund (McIntyre, Kutzin 2010, McIntyre, Gilson & 















is not possible for some citizens (especially the rich) to opt out of the system (McIntyre, 
Kutzin 2010).  The system is built on the principle of cross- subsidisation whereby the rich 
pay part of the health care costs of the poor (income cross-subsidy) and similarly, the healthy 
for the sick (risk cross-subsidy), the young for the old and even the urban dwellers cross-
subsidise rural dwellers (WHO 2010, McIntyre, Kutzin 2010).  It is also recommended that 
the poor who cannot make direct contributions are covered through public funds (taxes) for 
universal financial protection to be realised (WHO 2010). Increased public spending on 
health care is therefore crucial for universal coverage (WHO 2011). 
 To improve the ability of citizens to contribute effectively to publicly pooled funds, and also 
for governments to be able to raise additional revenue to increase public spending, it is often 
stated that there must exist strong economic growth, large formal sector employment and a 
large fiscal space among other factors (Evans 2007, McIntyre 2007, Carrin, James 2005).  It 
is, however, argued that these conditions are not favourable within the context of low-and 
middle-income countries. Hence, governments of LMICs have a limited ability to mobilize 
additional revenue from domestic sources in order to increase the proportion of public 
expenditure on health care (McIntyre 2007, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011). 
Some scholars have however, indicated that additional public revenue can still be mobilised 
by improving upon the administration and efficiency of tax collection,  reducing allowable 
deductions on tax returns, ensuring that an earmarked percentage of indirect tax (VAT) is 
allocated for health care while cutting down on unnecessary expensive public expenditure 
like foreign travels by government officials and excessive military activities (McIntyre 2007, 
McIntyre, Gilson & Mutyambizi 2005). The 2010 World Health Report also recommends 
increased government priority to the health sector in terms of budgetary allocations and 















transactions, Diaspora bonds, solidarity levies on products such as mobile phones as well as 
taxes on harmful products like alcohol, tobacco and sugary drinks as other ways of raising 
additional revenue within LMICs.  Notwithstanding the above, the WHO (2010) again called 
upon the international community to support the efforts of poor countries to achieve universal 
coverage. 
Also, the existence of strong political commitment, government stewardship, social solidarity 
and a high level of population trust in its governance system are other essential ingredients 
for the transition to universal coverage (WHO 2010, Evans 2007, Yang, Holst 2007, Hsiao 
2007). Some degree of compulsion through the enforcement of legislative instruments is also 
necessary for universal financial protection (Carrin, James 2004). 
However, it must be noted that universal financial protection is not the end goal of health 
systems financing but a means to achieving the ultimate goal of universal coverage. As 
citizens contribute as much as they can to the pooled fund, they should therefore also be 
given the opportunity to benefit from health care as much as they need. Equity in the 
distribution of health service infrastructure and health personnel is therefore recommended as 
a pre-requisite for universal coverage as it offers the insured population (those with financial 
protection), irrespective of their location and socio-economic status, equitable access to good 
quality health care (WHO 2010, WHO 2005b). 
2.4. Prepayment systems for achieving universal financial protection 
2.4.1. Introduction 
Prepayment health care financing systems can be viewed in different ways: contributory 
health insurance vs. tax-funded systems, mandatory vs. voluntary prepayment systems and 
mixed prepayment systems. These different ways of looking at prepayment systems and their 















2.4.2. Contributory health insurance vs. tax-funded systems 
 Based on the predominant sources of funding, prepayment health care financing systems can 
be classified into taxed-based financing (TBF) and contributory health insurance (CHI) 
systems (Evans 2007, Savedoff 2004).    
 In a tax-funded system, health care is funded from general tax revenue, earmarked taxes and 
other forms of government revenue (McIntyre, Kutzin 2010, Wagstaff 2010). General tax 
revenue comes from personal income taxes, company taxes, general sales tax (GST) or value 
added tax (VAT), custom and excise tax and fuel levies, among others (McIntyre 2007, 
Savedoff 2004). Earmarked or dedicated taxes offer more opportunities for sustainability in 
health sector revenue than general taxes. This is because while earmarked taxes are 
specifically collected and allocated to the health sector (Maxwell 1988), health has to 
compete with other sectors of the economy for allocations from general tax revenue 
(McIntyre 2007). Earmarked taxes for funding health care are however, limited in existence. 
Within LMICs, earmarked taxes exist in few countries. These include Zimbabwe for 
HIV/AIDS treatment; Ghana, which has dedicated an additional 2.5% VAT for health care; 
and Latvia, which implemented a dedicated tax for health care between 1998 and 2003 
(McIntyre 2007, Tragakes et al. 2008). However, in the case of Ghana and Latvia, these 
dedicated taxes are/were used to support insurance systems. In general, the main source of 
revenue for a tax-funded system is general tax revenue (McIntyre 2007, Savedoff 2004). 
Contributory health insurance systems comprise: social health insurance (SHI), community-
based health insurance (CBHI), private health insurance (PHI) and national health insurance 
(NHI) systems. The concept social health insurance has been defined and used differently by 
various authors. Some writers limit its definition and application to the type of health 















sector workers (Wagstaff 2009, Carrin 2003). Others have defined and used it in the broader 
sense to cover all forms of non-profit oriented health insurance systems that target the poor or 
the broader society (Hsiao 2007). It is in the light of this that the literature seems to also 
present a limited distinction between SHI and National Health Insurance (NHI). This study 
considers SHI as the kind of insurance that targets the formal sector, where contributions are 
income-rated and payroll deducted, and contributors and their dependants are entitled to a 
minimum standardised benefits package (Hsiao 2007). In an SHI system, the premium is 
usually charged as a percentage of an employee’s salary and it is paid by the employee and/or 
the employer (Hsiao 2007, Hoare, Mills 1986, Ron, Abel-Smith & Tamburi 1990).  
CBHIS are usually not-for-profit insurance schemes. They target the informal sector, 
contributions to such systems are community-rated and often charged at a flat rate, and some 
do provide premium exemptions for the very poor (Carrin 2003, Arhinful 2003, Eklund, 
Stavem 1996).   
In this study, NHI is seen to be broader than SHI and CBHIS. An NHI system refers to an 
insurance system that targets the entire population seeking to cover both the formal and 
informal sectors as well as the poor who cannot afford to make a contribution (McIntyre, 
Gilson & Mutyambizi 2005).  With an NHI, part of the premiums, especially that for the 
poor, is paid from tax revenue (McIntyre, Gilson & Mutyambizi 2005). Hence, some scholars 
have referred to an NHI system as that of a universal health system (McIntyre, Gilson & 
Mutyambizi 2005, McIntyre 2010).  
Private health insurance systems, on the other hand, are non-state controlled schemes that 















Ataguba, Akazili 2010). For this study, the concept of private health insurance is limited to 
only private for-profit health insurance systems.  
There is a debate in the literature as regards which system, tax-funded or contributory health 
insurance, is more suitable for moving towards universal coverage. It is argued that, since 
contributory health insurance systems involve regular direct contributions to the pooled fund, 
they guarantee security and sustainability in funding health care more than tax-funded 
systems where the allocation of tax revenue to the health sector depends on the economic 
situation at a particular point in time and the level of political commitment to the health 
sector (Hsiao 2007). Moreover, since revenues from insurance premiums are directly used for 
health care, it is argued that residents are usually more likely to accept to pay insurance 
premiums than higher taxes (McIntyre 2007, Wagstaff 2010). It is also believed that, 
contributory health insurance make people more responsible for their own health care than 
tax-funded systems, where contributions are usually indirect and in most cases people feel the 
services are offered free of charge (Savedoff 2004). 
On the other hand, in countries where contributory insurance systems are introduced, 
governments tend to view them as substitutes for budgetary allocations to the health sector 
and hence sometimes allocate less of the budget for health care (Wagstaff 2010, 
Langenbrunner, Sheiman & Kehler 2008). Also, it is usually difficult and administratively 
expensive to enforce contributory health insurance within the informal sector where most 
workers are self-employed (Wagstaff 2010, Savedoff 2004). Also, unlike tax-funded systems 
where resources and risks are pooled from the whole population into a single integrated pool 
that allows effective cross-subsidisation, pooling and cross subsidisation in contributory 















there is no effective risk equalisation system for their integration (Wagstaff 2010, McIntyre et 
al. 2008).  
In addition, while insurance contributions are usually at best proportional (if payroll 
deducted) and at worse regressive (if extended to the informal sector),  tax-funded systems 
are relatively progressive since direct taxes are usually progressively structured and even 
within poor countries where most commodities consumed by the poor are exempted from 
indirect taxes, even indirect taxes like VAT have also been reported to be progressive 
(McIntyre, Kutzin 2010, Kutzin 2000, Kutzin et al. 2009, Kutzin 2007).  
Contributory health insurance is not therefore likely to succeed in extending coverage to the 
informal sector if solely relied upon.  Tax funding looks appealing for universal coverage, 
especially in terms of extending coverage to the informal sector, but prevailing economic and 
political conditions can also limit its sustainability.   
2.4.3. Mandatory vs. voluntary prepayment systems 
On the basis of the degree of legal compulsion that exists with regard to contribution to the 
prepaid fund, the options for universal coverage are sometimes classified into mandatory and 
voluntary prepayment systems (McIntyre, Kutzin 2010). Mandatory systems are usually 
established by legislative instruments. They include taxation and compulsory health 
insurance systems such as SHI and mandatory NHI while the voluntary ones are CBHI and 
private health insurance systems.  The key weaknesses of voluntary prepayment systems are 
that: they make provisions for opting out; they are associated with adverse selection; they 
lead to fragmentation in pooling; they are limited in population coverage and hence are 
associated with inequities in financial protection (Mills 2007). Cross-subsidisation in 
voluntary systems is usually not effective, since the rich tend to self-select into private 















subside the health care costs of their fellow rich and similarly, the poor cross-subsidise their 
poor counterparts (McIntyre 2007). A higher degree of political commitment is required for 
the implementation and sustainability of mandatory systems than voluntary systems 
(McIntyre, Kutzin 2010). For these reasons, it is not likely that voluntary prepaid systems can 
achieve universal coverage if totally relied on. 
2.4.4. Mixed prepayment systems 
It is argued that the conventional classifications of prepayment systems discussed above is 
inadequate in describing health systems, since such classifications limit the spectrum of 
universal coverage reform options that are available to countries (Kutzin 2000).  Also, such 
classifications tend to ignore the fact that neither a single tax-funded system nor a single 
contributory insurance system can be relied upon as a one-size-fits-all model for universal 
coverage (Kutzin 2000). Each of these options has its relative merits and demerits specifically 
in relation to how it is designed and implemented within the political, socio-economic and 
institutional context of the country under consideration (WHO 2010, McIntyre, Kutzin 2010, 
Wagstaff 2010, Mills 2007, Agyepong, Orem & Hercot 2011). Moreover, there is practically 
no country that operates a health care financing system that is purely tax-funded or 
exclusively based on contributory insurance (WHO 2010, Wagstaff 2009). 
It is against the above background that some scholars advocate for an approach to health care 
financing that pools resources from a wide range of financing sources in a way that is 
contextually appropriate irrespective of the name such as system bears (Kutzin 2000, 
McIntyre 2010, Kutzin 2007, Mathauer 2009, Gupta 2007).  A framework for analysing 
health care financing systems based on this mixed pooling view has been provided by Kutzin 















pooling of funds and risks, purchasing and provision of health care services as essentials in 
the (re-)organisation of health care financing systems (Kutzin 2001). 
Another framework for universal coverage which puts emphasis on pooling from different 
sources is provided by Mathauer (2009). In her framework, three essential elements for 
universal financial protection and hence universal coverage have been outlined. These are: 
the proportion of the population that is covered by prepayment financing systems which is 
referred to as the breadth of coverage; the range of health services covered by this public 
funding which is the depth of coverage; and the proportion of health care cost that is covered 
by prepayment funds which is referred to as the height of coverage (McIntyre 2010, 
Mathauer 2009). Mathauer (2009) and other writers who adopted or referred to this 
framework in their work (WHO 2010, McIntyre 2010, Nguyen 2011) argue that a country 
must examine its current coverage levels in relation to the potential maximum attainable 
levels so as to identify the constraints on extension of coverage. To them, the move towards 
universal coverage entails efforts at extending the breadth, depth and height of coverage 
towards the desirable maximum levels. The desirable target for universal coverage is 100% 
coverage in breadth, depth and height but no country has ever achieved that (WHO 2010).  It 
is therefore very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve very high population coverage with 
very comprehensive coverage in services and cost. There is always a trade-off that should be 
made within the three areas of coverage (WHO 2010, Mathauer 2009). 
 2.4.5. Conclusion  
This section has illustrated that there is no single health care financing system that is a one-
size-fits-all model for universal coverage. Contributory health insurance cannot exclusively 
be relied on to provide universal coverage because such systems are difficult to implement 















progressive and less expensive to run than contributory insurance systems. However, 
contextual and political conditions can also limit their sustainability. Mandatory prepayment 
systems are a necessary condition for universal coverage. Mixed prepayment systems which 
involve pooling of funds and risk hold greater prospects for universal coverage and hence are 
currently at the core of the universal coverage debate.  
2.5. The concept of health insurance 
There is often limited distinction between insurance as an objective of health care financing 
and the instruments that are used to realise this goal (Kutzin 2007). It is argued that the direct 
policy objective of every prepayment system is to achieve financial protection (Kutzin 2007). 
This is reflected in the definition of health insurance according to Gupta (2007) as what “can 
help defer, delay, reduce or altogether avoid payment for health care incurred by individuals 
and households” (Gupta 2007:111). Any health care financing system which achieves 
financial protection can therefore be referred to as an insurance system no matter how it is 
funded (Kutzin 2007, Gupta 2007).  Kutzin (2007) argues that the existence of an insurance 
scheme is only one instrument for achieving the insurance objective but it does not 
necessarily guarantee insurance in the sense of financial protection. Also, it is possible to 
have insurance in the absence of an insurance scheme.  According to him, fully tax-funded 
systems or health care subsidies that protect residents from bearing the full cost of health care 
are also ways of achieving the insurance objective.   
Confusion in the use of the term insurance is quite common. For example, McIntyre (2010) 
reported that the use of the term national health insurance (NHI) as used in the intended 
reforms of the South African health care financing system has created confusion given that it 
is intended to be (largely) tax-funded. This perhaps is because many understand the concept 















to appreciate how a tax-funded system will be considered as an insurance system.  It is 
therefore worth noting that stakeholders can reject reforms that have the potential of insuring 
the population just on the grounds that they bear “vocabulary” that do not conform with their 
understanding  of the concept of insurance (McIntyre 2010). 
2. 6. Empirical evidence on approaches to universal financial protection 
2.6.1. Introduction 
This section examines progress in implementing prepayment systems, in covering formal 
sector workers, the poor and informal sector workers. Particular emphasis is given to specific 
empirical examples from LMICs. 
2.6.2. Countries on the path to universal coverage 
Globally, a few countries such as Germany, Belgium, Austria, Japan, Korea, Thailand and 
Malaysia are often cited as countries that have attained universal coverage (WHO 2010, 
Carrin, James 2004, Evans 2007, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011, Jongudomsuk 2007). Most 
of these are high-income countries, but some low- and middle-income countries that were 
acknowledged by WHO (2010) as popular examples of countries on the pathway to universal 
coverage are: “Chile, Colombia, Cuba, Rwanda, Sri Lanka and Thailand” (WHO 2010:7).  
Countries such as “Brazil, Costa Rica, Ghana, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, the Republic of 
Moldova, Gabon, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Mali, the Philippines, Tunisia and 
Viet Nam” (WHO 2010:7) have also been reported to have made significant progress in 
implementing prepayment systems. 
2.6.3. Covering the formal sector via contributory health insurance 
Empirical evidence suggests that contributory health insurance, specifically SHI, can be 
successful in guaranteeing financial protection for the formal sector (WHO 2005a).  Apart 
from Thailand, which has a relatively large informal sector the economies of most of the 















relatively easy for them to enforce contributory health insurance mechanisms, specifically 
SHI. However, even with economies that have relatively large formal sectors, it can still take 
a long time to achieve universal financial protection through contributory health insurance 
(Bärnighausen, Sauerborn 2002). For instance, it took Germany (the first) 127 years, Belgium 
118 years, Austria about 77 years, Japan 36 years and the Republic of Korea (most recent) 26 
years to achieve universal financial protection through compulsory contributory health 
insurance (McIntyre 2007, Carrin, James 2005). 
2.6.4 Covering the poor through exemption packages 
It has been documented that targeted exemption packages financed out of tax revenue was 
mainly relied upon by some Southeast-Asian countries to provide financial protection for the 
poor and vulnerable (Tangcharoensathein et al. 2011, Bodart, Jowett 2007, 
Tangcharoensathein et al. 2009). These programmes however, were not effectively 
implemented. The following are specific examples as reported by the above authors. Lao 
introduced a user fee exemption package for the poor in 1995 but it failed partly because 
village leaders identified the poor on an ad hoc basis. Indonesia introduced a targeted tax-
based financing scheme for the poor but financial limitations affected its success. The 
Philippines initiated a sponsored targeted programme for the poor who were supposed to be 
identified by local government authorities but its success was largely dependant upon 
political will and availability of economic resources. Thailand (1975-2002) introduced 
exemption for the poor under which the poor were supposed to be identified by health 
workers, and later under a means test, but nepotism affected its success. The problem has 
been that the target beneficiaries of these programmes were very difficult to identify. 
Colombia tried to depend on survey data on incomes to identify the poor, while Thailand and 
the Philippines, depended largely on local authorities to identify the poor, but in all cases the 















in the implementation of targeted exemptions for the poor has also been reported in Ghana 
and other LMICs (Hsiao 2007, Garshong et al. 2001, Nyonator, Kutzin 1999). 
2.6.5 Covering informal sector workers through contributory health insurance 
In Southeast-Asia, the Philippines, Vietnam and Korea have implemented contributory health 
insurance schemes for the informal sector with premiums collected from taxi drivers, meat 
sellers, street vendors and other non-payroll income earning occupational groups (Yang, 
Holst 2007, Tangcharoensathein et al. 2011, Anderson 1989). African countries such as 
Rwanda, Uganda and Senegal have also relied largely on CBHIs to extend coverage to the 
informal sectors of their economies (Samson 2009, Jütting 2004). Evidence from these 
experiences has shown that not only has it often been very difficult to enforce premium 
contributions in the informal sector, but in most cases subsidisation from tax revenue was still 
required for the survival of the schemes (Tangcharoensathein et al. 2011, Jütting 2004). A 
recent review therefore noted that without adequate supplementary government funding and 
political stewardship, contributory health insurance tends to have negative implications for 
the equity and efficiency of financing health care for the informal sector (Joint NGO 2008).   
For instance, the Philippines and Colombia in 1995 and 1993 respectively, introduced 
contributory health insurance systems for universal coverage (Hsiao 2007).  These countries 
put in place innovative measures in order to get the poor and informal sector workers to enrol 
into the schemes but none was able to achieve its universal coverage targets because most of 
the poor and the informal sector workers still could not be covered. Colombia for instance 
heavily subsidised the premiums for the poor and the informal sector while reducing their 
benefit package but this trade-off still did not yield the needed results for universal coverage. 
The Philippines has recently tried to identify informal sector workers by the groups, 















groups as a means of enrolling and collecting premiums from them (Hsiao 2007, Jowett, 
Hsiao 2007). 
Rwanda is one of the low-income countries whose efforts at achieving universal coverage 
have been acknowledged internationally. Rwanda has been reported to have achieved 
population coverage of over 80%, though the Rwanda government puts the figure at about 
91% (WHO 2010, WHO 2008b). Coverage under the Rwandan system is limited in terms of 
depth (services) and height (cost). Rwanda operates three separate health insurance schemes: 
one for formal sector government and private (though voluntary) employees, another for the 
military and the other scheme for the rest of the population who are mostly found in the rural 
informal sector. The Rwandan system is however, not an exclusively contributory insurance 
system as only half of the funds are from premiums collected from members of the schemes 
and the other half comes from government revenue through taxes and donor funds (WHO 
2010). Apart from challenges in relation to how to expand the width and height of coverage, 
the other major obstacles in the Rwandan system are how to make the premiums affordable to 
the poor and those in the informal sector as well as overcome fragmentation in pooling due to 
the absence of a national legal framework for the integration of the three different schemes 
(WHO 2010, WHO 2008b). 
2.6.6.   Universal coverage through tax funding in Thailand  
The experience of Thailand can be described as a major success story within the LMIC 
setting. Having unsuccessfully tried to completely cover the entire informal sector through 
contributory health insurance schemes, Thailand adopted a general tax-funded system after its 
2001 general election in order to extend the breadth of coverage to the 30% of the population 
that was still uncovered (Limwattananon, Tangcharoensathein & Prakongsai 2005). This 















those who were not already covered under any of the existing SHI schemes were identified 
and government paid for their coverage from tax revenue (Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). 
The funds from all the existing SHI schemes were pooled together into a national pool and 
providers are contracted on a capitation basis while beneficiaries are issued with universal 
coverage membership ID cards that they use to register with their providers 
(Hanvoravongchai, Hsiao 2007).  
It was the election that offered the window of opportunity for Thailand to do away with a 
contributory health insurance system in favour of a tax-based system for the informal sector 
(Tangcharoensathein et al. 2011, Hanvoravongchai, Hsiao 2007). This is because it was one 
of the main campaign promises of the Prime Minister during the election campaign (Hsiao 
2007). It is also reported that at the time, it had already been established that such a system 
was feasible (Tangcharoensathein et al. 2011). However, its long term financial sustainability 
is still not clear (WHO 2010, Somkotra, Lagrade 2009). This is because the benefit package 
is comprehensive and there are no co-payments or deductibles, though their capitation system 
is reported to be very effective (WHO 2010).  
2.7. The Ghanaian approach to universal financial protection  
The issue of universal financial protection is not new in the Ghanaian history of health care 
financing. A detailed description of the historical context of health care financing in Ghana 
since the colonial period is provided in ‘Part A’ of this dissertation (study protocol) and 
hence it has only been summarised in Table 1 below. Only the key issues of Ghana’s most 
recent attempt at universal coverage, how it relates to the experience of universal coverage 
reforms in other LMICs, and the key findings of relevant recent studies on this Ghanaian 




















Rationale/objective characteristics Implications for universal coverage (UC) 
Prospects challenges 
1957 Tax -funded •driven by good economic performance, 
strong natural resources and exports 
base at the time 
•Driven by socialist ideology of the  then 
ruling party 
•Free health care at all public facilities 
•Funded from general government revenues  
(taxes and donor funds) 
• Out-of-pocket payments (OOP) for private 
health care services. 
• provided protection against 
OOP payment  at  public 
facilities 
• comprehensive coverage of 
population, costs and services 
 •unsustainable due to  decline in 
economic performance and a change in 
government 
• insufficient budgetary allocations to 
health sector due to absence of 
earmarked tax 
1970s Nominal fee 
payments 
 
• To limit “ unnecessary” use 
• To recover part of recurrent cost  
• Conditionality of IMF and World bank  
• Public health care was funded from general tax 
revenues and minimal user fees in the form of 
co-payments 
• OOP  payments for services at private facilities 
offered some financial 
protection in terms of breadth 
and depth  of coverage 
•Limited financial protection in terms of 
height of coverage (cost) 






• To recover full cost for drugs 
 • A conditionality for IMF and World 
bank loans under the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
• Substantial user fees at public facilities at the 
point of service 
• Reduced fees for children and primary care  
• OOP  payments for services at private facilities 
User fee exemptions for 
pregnant women, the aged and 
the vulnerable 
• Exemptions were poorly implemented  
• Poor financial protection at the time 
• Decline in utilisation of public health 
services 






•To provide protection against OOP 
cost 
•encouraged and supported by NGOs 
and later the Ministry of Health 
•Funded from community contributions with 
support from  some donors  
•Covered mainly the informal sector 
•Financial protection for a  
few 
•Provided experimental basis 
for building solidarity for UC 
• Limited in population coverage (only 
1%) 
• Limited and fragmented pools, hence 





• To abolish cash- and-carry system 
• An election promise by then ruling 
party 
• Mandated by an Act of parliament 
•Funded from : 
- 2.5% (VAT) National Health insurance  
(NHI) levy 
- 2.5% payroll deductions from formal 
sector workers’ SSNITa pension fund 
-  Premiums from the informal sector 
and those formal sector workers not 
under SSNIT 
- Proceeds from NHIAb  investments 
- Budget allocations and donor funds 
•Targets both formal and 
informal sectors 
•Made NHI membership 
compulsory 
• Implies the existence of 
political will for UC 
•Covered over 60% of the 




•Still effectively voluntary for informal 
sector workers 
•District-based with fragmentation 
•Relatively low population coverage of 
the informal sector 
•Regressive informal sector premiums 
•Low impact on out-of-pocket payment 
and hence the persistence of the cash-
and-carry system 




•Based on a recognition of low NHIS 
enrolments from the informal sector as a 
threat to UC 
•An election promise  
•Not clear but most likely targeting  only the 
informal sector (Agyepong et al, 2011) 
•No policy document in the public domain 
• Issue to be considered by this study 
A key focus of this study A key focus of this study 
Source: (Ramachandra & Hsiao, 2007; MOH, 2004; Agyepong et al, 2011) Note: SSNIT = Social Security and National Insurance Trust. a. Formal sector employees contribute 5 percent of their incomes to the SSNIT and their 
















As shown in Table 1, the most recent attempt at universal financial protection in Ghana came 
in 2004, when a mandatory NHI scheme became operational (MOH 2004). The Ghanaian 
approach has been applauded in the literature as one of the most innovative strategies in 
Africa (McIntyre 2007, Samson 2009, MOH 2009). This is because it is in contrast with what 
Kutzin (2007) referred to as the myth that health insurance must first be introduced for the 
formal sector and then later extended to the informal sector; Ghana’s reform aimed from the 
outset to cover the entire population. The Ghanaian NHIS was developed out of Ghana’s 
experience with CBHIS that operated in the informal sector for many years before the 
introduction of the NHIS (McIntyre 2007). 
As illustrated in Table 1, insurance premiums are collected mainly from the informal sector. 
These informal sector premiums are supposed to be structured according to ability-to-pay as 
shown in Table 2 below. 
Table 2: Criteria for charging differentiated premiums 
Social group Description Minimum 
contribution 
Core poor (A) Adults who are unemployed and do not receive any 
identifiable and constant support from elsewhere for 
survival. 
Free 
Very poor (B) Adults, who are unemployed, but receive identifiable 




Poor (C) Adults, who are employed, but receive low returns for 









Rich (E) Adults, who are able to meet their basic needs and 
some of their wants 
GH¢48.00 
(US$32) 





















However, as the NHIS currently operates, many of the district schemes (DMHIS) charge a 
flat rate premium because of the difficulty in assessing households’ income levels for 
enforcing differentiated premiums (McIntyre et al, 2008, Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011). This 
makes the informal sector premiums very regressive (Akazili 2010). The burden of direct 
payments to the NHIS is solely on informal sector households as companies currently do not 
contribute to the NHIS funding and most formal sector  workers (SSNIT contributors) are 
also exempted from paying the DMHIS premium (Agyepong, Adjei 2008, Asenso-Boadi, 
Agbeibor 2010).  
It is also important to note that, if what is contained in the NHIS ACT, Act 650 (2-3), is 
anything to go by, formal sector workers who are under the SSNIT pension scheme may not 
in reality be contributing to the NHIS. This is because the government has assured them that, 
their future pension payment will be based on the full 17.5% of their contributions to the 
SSNIT fund and not the remaining 15% after the 2.5% deductions are made to the NHIS on 
their behalf (Agyepong, Adjei 2008, Wahab 2008). In effect, the SSNIT component is a form 
of loan to government from SSNIT to finance the NHIS rather than a health insurance 
premium that is collected from members of SSNIT.  However, there is currently no data in 
the public domain as to whether or not government is repaying SSNIT. 
Similar to the challenges faced by other LMICs in enforcing premiums payments in the 
informal sector (Tangcharoensathein et al. 2011, Jütting 2004), the process of collecting these 
informal sector premiums in Ghana has been described as very cumbersome, expensive and 
prone to fraud on the part of premium collectors (Akazili 2010), yet the revenue that is 
generated from these premiums constitute only a small proportion of the income base of the 
















Insurance Levy, charged on all VAT-able goods (McIntyre et al. 2008), that contributes 
almost 70% of the total funding to the NHIS (Results for Development Institute, Adjei 2010). 
As an indication of progress towards universal financial protection, total prepayment funding 
as a proportion of domestic health care expenditure in Ghana was recently estimated to be 
about 53% while the remaining 47% still comes from out-of-pocket expenditure (Akazili 
2010). For the prepayment component, general tax revenue constitutes about 47% while 
insurance contributions constitute only 5% (Akazili 2010).  This implies that even with the 
introduction of the NHIS, prepayment funding for health care is still largely from tax 
revenue.  A recent study also found that out-of-pocket expenditure as a proportion of private 
expenditure between 2000 and 2007 only reduced by 0.3% (Soors 2010). Brugiavini & Pace 
(2010) therefore reported that the Ghanaian NHIS has not had a significant effect on out-of-
pocket expenditure yet. 
As regards population coverage under the NHIS, there have been considerable debates and 
inconsistencies in the literature. However, many reports, studies and conference presentations 
have reported population coverage of between 50% and 70% (Akazili 2010, Asenso-Boadi, 
Agbeibor 2010, NHIA 2010b, MOH 2010, Durairaj, D'Almeida & Kirigia 2010).  A recent 
publication by Oxfam i  collaboration with some local Ghanaian NGOs, which has been 
widely challenged, indicates that the population coverage could be below 18% (Oxfam et al. 
2011). Other low estimates were those by Nguyen (2011), who reported population coverage 
of about 35% in 2007 and Boateng (2008) who reported 42% population coverage for the 
same year. What is, however, clear in the literature is that Ghana has not yet attained 
universal population coverage. It is also indisputable that the majority of those who are not 
yet covered are the poor and informal sector workers whose membership is dependant upon 
















contributors are also required to go to a scheme’s office to register, pay a registration fee and 
renew their membership on an annual basis, quite a number of them are also not covered 
under the NHIS. 
However, while some are concerned about the long-term sustainability of the scheme and 
hence are calling for a reduction in the benefit package and the introduction of co-payments 
(Witter, Garshong 2009), others are suggesting that the surest way of attaining universal 
coverage is to adopt the Thailand approach of fully funding informal sector contributions 
from tax revenue (Akazili 2010). Ghana’s proposal to implement a one-time NHIS premium 
payment (OTPP) for the informal sector could therefore be viewed in relation to broader 
attempts at achieving universal financial protection for the poor and informal sector workers.   
2.8. The proposed one-time premium payment (OTPP) policy of Ghana 
The main formal document that currently exists on the Ghanaian OTPP is the ruling National 
Democratic Congress (NDC) party manifesto of 2008 (then opposition) from where the 
policy issue originated.  A number of reports, studies and conference presentations on the 
Ghanaian NHIS either made mentioned of it (Akazili 2010, MOH 2009, Asenso-Boadi, 
Agbeibor 2010, NHIA 2010b, Soors 2010, MOH 2010, Oxfam et al. 2011, NHIA 2010a) or 
presented the opinions of the writers on the policy issue (Agyepong, Orem & Hercot 2011). 
Much of the debate on the proposed policy is currently based on speculation as there is no 
policy document in the public domain on the content of the policy. The debaters seem to 
agree on the point that it may affect only the informal sector, and may be similar to that of a 
tax-funded system for the informal sector (Agyepong, Orem & Hercot 2011, Oxfam et al. 
2011). It is important to note that the debates on the OTPP seem to have been influenced by 
local and international politics and ideological orientations (Agyepong, Orem & Hercot 
















immediately implement the policy (Soors 2010, Oxfam et al. 2011). This is because they 
believe it will make NHIS funding progressive (Oxfam et al. 2011). Some have also argued 
that, its timing is wrong as Ghana is currently faced with limited ability to raise additional 
revenues, limited health infrastructure, personnel and equipment, and hence merely removing 
premium payments is not a guarantee that there will be equitable access to quality health care 
(Agyepong, Orem & Hercot 2011). A recent publication by Oxfam et al. (2011) also suggests 
that the World Bank is not in favour of the OTPP since the Bank currently promotes the 
Ghanaian NHIS as a model for other LMICs. 
It has also been reported that actuarial studies, feasibility analysis and willingness to pay 
studies on the one-time premium policy have been done (NHIA 2010a), but none of the 
results of these studies has officially been made known to the public. Nevertheless, the 2009 
NHIA annual report indicates that the results from such studies show that the policy will be 
sustainable and feasible and hence a road map has been designed but has not been released to 
the public. 
Though this review has not identified any country that practices a health insurance system 
that includes a one-time premium, the review has revealed countries like Thailand who fully 
fund the health insurance contributions of the informal sector from tax revenue. Other 
countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Moldova have also adopted this strategy for universal 
coverage (Yang, Holst 2007, Akazili 2010). As in the case of Thailand, the fact that the one-
time premium payment policy was an election promise gives an indication that at least there 
is strong political will to achieve universal coverage in Ghana. However, in Thailand the 
financial sustainability and technical feasibility of a tax-funded system for informal sector 
coverage was established long before it became an election campaign promise 
















strategy to extend coverage to the informal sector appears to have been established, and while 
some studies on the feasibility of universal coverage in Ghana have been undertaken (ILO 
2006, NHIA 2010b), the results have not been made available widely and are not regarded as 
politically acceptable. Also, no research was specifically conducted on the feasibility and 
sustainability of the one-time premium policy proposal before it was made a campaign 
promise. Nevertheless, if it is feasible and financially sustainable to implement this policy, 
this perhaps could be a window of opportunity for Ghana to achieve the long awaited goal of 
universal financial protection. The absence of empirical data on the feasibility of this 
proposed policy is the motivation for this dissertation as it seeks to contribute information to 
aid the assessment of the feasibility of the proposed one-time premium policy, and its 
prospects and challenges for universal coverage. It intends to assess feasibility from the 
perspective of stakeholder understanding and views on the OTPP. 
3. Stakeholder analysis techniques and actor dynamics in health care financing reforms 
within LMICs 
3.1. Who is a stakeholder? 
Stakeholders are policy actors (Walt, Gilson 1994). They are individuals, groups, 
organisations or networks that have an interest in a policy issue and the ability to influence 
the policy process (Brugha, Varvasovszky 2000, ODA 1995). Hence, stakeholders are not 
only those who are officially commissioned to formulate and implement policies, but all 
actors, whose interest may in one way or the other be affected by the implementation of the 
policy (Gilson, Raphaely 2008). Based on how positively or negatively a policy affects the 
interest of its key actors, stakeholders could be seen as winners or losers from a policy 
change (ODA 1995). They could either come from the internal or external environments 
within which the policy issue is being considered (Brugha, Varvasovszky 2000) and 
















categorised into primary and secondary stakeholders or major and minor stakeholders (ODA 
1995, Clarkson 1995, Freeman 1984, Frost 1995).  
Stakeholders are said to either present themselves as visible or hidden participants of the 
policy process (Kingdon 1984) and their influence could either be active or passive. The 
visible and active stakeholders are often directly involved in the production, management, 
regulation or evaluation of the policy process (Novick, Mays 2001).  They are either within 
or outside the state’s bureaucracy (Tantivess, Walt 2008). If they are within the state’s 
bureaucracy, they are either policy authorisers at the top, middle-level managers or street 
level bureaucrats interacting directly with beneficiaries of the policy at the lower 
implementation level (Erasmus, Gilson 2008). Those stakeholders outside the state’s 
bureaucracy could either be interest groups such as medical associations, religious groups, 
private sector institutions, labour unions, civil society organisations and NGOs, the media or 
beneficiaries of the policy (Erasmus, Gilson 2008, Gilson et al. 2003).  
Drawing on the above categorisations, this study identifies stakeholders on the basis of the 
interest an individual, organisation, department or institution has in a policy, their position or 
behaviour and attitude towards it, the power and the resources they can bring to bear on the 
policy process and their potential influence on the policy process (Brugha, Varvasovszky 
2000). Specific stakeholders in the health sector would therefore comprise: international 
donors, national political leaders and legislators, public officials of the Ministry of Health and 
the Ministry of Finance, organised labour, private sector organisations, non-governmental 

















3.2. Stakeholder characteristics  
Stakeholder characteristics refers to stakeholders’ understanding of or knowledge of a policy 
issue, their interest, positions, powers and actual or potential influence on the formulation and 
implementation of the policy (Brugha, Varvasovszky 2000, Gilson et al. 2003, Schmeer 
2000). In most cases, the stakeholder’s interest and positions on a policy issue is driven by 
how s/he understands the policy concept and the purpose of the reforms. Hence, lack of 
clarity on policy goals, such as the goal of equity, can bring about confusion in the 
perceptions of stakeholders about a reform process (Gilson, Antezana & Bennett 2000).  
The interest of a stakeholder relates to the perception of the stakeholder about the likely 
impact of a policy process on it, which could either be positive or negative (Thomas, Gilson 
2004). Therefore, the extent to which a stakeholder will be affected by the implementation of 
a policy defines the interest of that stakeholder in the policy issue (Roberts et al. 2008). The 
interest a stakeholder has in the implementation of a particular policy issue can be determined 
by considering the advantages and disadvantages for the stakeholder as a result of the 
implementation of the policy (Schmeer 2000). It is, therefore, possible to assess and present 
the various levels of interest that different stakeholders have in a particular policy on an 
ordinal scale of low, medium and high interest (Varavasovszky, Brugha 2000). A 
stakeholder’s interest in a policy could be driven by political, economic, professional or even 
ideological reasons (Gilson, Antezana & Bennett 2000). A single stakeholder could however, 
have multiple interests in a policy which could be clearly visible or hidden (ODA 1995). 
Another important stakeholder characteristic is the stakeholder’s position on a policy issue. 
Driven by the interest they have in a policy, stakeholders will tend to either support, oppose 
or remain neutral or non-mobilised on a policy issue. The level of support or opposition of a 
















A spectrum of positioning from strong support to strong opposition is usually used to 
illustrate the relative position of a stakeholder on a policy (Schmeer 2000). Data on the 
position of a stakeholder on a policy issue could be obtained from the opinion of the 
stakeholder or the opinion of other stakeholders about it (ODA 1995) or even from 
documentary sources. 
Of considerable importance to stakeholder analysis is an examination of the power of a 
stakeholder to influence a policy. Though very significant in stakeholder analysis, power is 
often not critically examined, especially within LMICs (Erasmus, Gilson 2008, Gilson, 
Raphaely 2008). The power of a stakeholder is usually reflected in the stakeholder’s ability to 
either facilitate or block the policy process (Thomas, Gilson 2004). Power is a tool 
stakeholders use to protect their interest (Erasmus and Gilson, 2008). Stakeholders derive 
their power from the nature of their organisations, their control over resources (budget or 
strategic resources), and their possession of legal authority, information, specialised skills or 
knowledge, leadership ability, connections with other powerful stakeholders like politicians 
and ability to influence public opinion  (ODA 1995, Tantivess, Walt 2008, Weible 2006). In 
exercising their power, stakeholders can control the decision-making process, facilitate it, or 
weaken or negatively influence the policy and its implementation (Crosby 1991).  
Stakeholders’ power can be categorised into: power as decision making; power as non-
decision making and power as thought control (Lukes 2005). Stakeholders can use the first 
two forms of power to facilitate or undermine the implementation process of a policy and the 
third form is mainly used to influence the understanding and perception of stakeholders 
against or in favour of a policy. In a top-down view of policy implementation, policy 
authorisers at the top level of bureaucracy usually possess instructional powers that they can 
use to initiate policies and demand compliance but, within the bottom-up perspective, street-
















powers they can use to reshape, elaborate or even reject a policy (Hudson 2009, Lipsky 2010, 
Scott, Mathews & Gilson 2011, Hill 1984, Hill, Hupe 2002). For example, they can 
deliberately refuse to see patients or take long tea breaks (Erasmus, Gilson 2008). This study 
adopts a mixed perspective (both top-down and bottom-up) of policy implementation. 
Depending on the power and position of stakeholders on a policy, we could examine the 
influence stakeholders have on a policy by categorising them into policy drivers comprising 
those with high power and high support, supporters who have low power but high support, 
blockers who have high power but low support for the policy and bystanders or abstainers 
with relatively low support and power (Hyder et al. 2010). Alternatively, examining the 
influence of stakeholders, in relation to their interest and power on a policy, Eden (1996) 
categorised stakeholders into players who have high interest and high power, leaders  with 
high power but low interest, subjects with high interest but low power and the crowd who 
have both low interest and power with regard to the policy. Stakeholders can therefore be said 
to influence policies by driving the policy process, supporting or facilitating it, blocking it or 
sitting on the fence.   
3.3. Stakeholder analysis 
An analysis that examines the interest, positions, power, alliances and influence of various 
stakeholders on the policy process and the importance of such influences on the realisation of 
the policy’s goals is therefore referred to as a stakeholder analysis (Schmeer 2000, 
Varavasovszky, Brugha 2000). This analysis could be done at any stage of the policy process 
(Reich 1995, Frenk 1995). It could even be done before the development of a policy 
document (Mehrizi, Ghasemzadeh  & Molas-Gallart 2009). Depending on the purpose of the 
analysis, a stakeholder analysis could be done retrospectively to reveal the roles stakeholders 
















implementation of a policy change (Varavasovszky, Brugha 2000) and to identify which 
actors should be involved in the policy process (MDF 2005). Prospective analysis is future-
oriented (Hyder et al. 2010) and hence can be used to assess the feasibility of a change 
process or to think through the acceptability of a proposed policy idea (Mathauer et al. 2008). 
There are, however, several different levels at which stakeholder analysis can be done: it can 
be done at the international, national, local and even the individual level and either by an 
individual or a team within or outside the organisation by whom the policy is being 
considered (Varavasovszky, Brugha 2000, Hyder et al. 2010). However, doing a stakeholder 
analysis as a group of both insiders and outsiders may offer greater opportunities for coming 
out with results that will be more acceptable to other stakeholders than if undertaken as an 
individual (Varavasovszky, Brugha 2000). The evolution and processes of carrying out a 
stakeholder analysis, its purposes and the various ways in which the outcome of the analysis 
can be used to inform policy has been quite widely documented (Brugha, Varvasovszky 
2000, Schmeer 2000, Hyder et al. 2010) and so will not be repeated here. 
3.4. Stakeholder dynamics on health care financing reforms aimed at universal coverage 
in Ghana and other LMICs 
The key stakeholders with respect to health care financing policy (especially health 
insurance) in Ghana include: the president, the Ministry of Health (political-the minister, and 
civil servants), politicians (especially the two main political parties- NDC and NPP), labour 
unions (Trade Union Congress, and medical, dental, nurses and other health sector workers’ 
associations), civil society organisations, the staff of the National Health Insurance Authority 
and international donors (Rajkotia 2007, Agyepong, Adjei 2008, Government of Ghana 
2003). The two main political parties (NDC and NPP) that dominate the current Ghanaian 
multi-party democratic political system, have in recent times made health insurance central to 
















formulate or modify health care financing policies in line with campaign promises. The 
Minister of Health is usually mandated to formulate health care financing policy in Ghana. 
The NHIA manages and coordinates the implementation of health insurance systems and also 
makes recommendations for the formulation of health insurance policies. The civil servants 
of the Ministry of Health and Ghana Health Service provide technical support for the 
formulation and implementation of health care financing policy respectively. Other key 
stakeholders are: the staff of the district mutual health insurance schemes, both public and 
private health workers (doctors, nurses, facility administrators etc) who are responsible for 
policy implementation at the local level, and the populace (both formal and informal sector 
workers) who are the ultimate beneficiaries of health care financing policies and who also 
bear the consequences of such policies (Government of Ghana 2003, MOH, 2004). 
In Ghana, retrospective analysis of the introduction of the National Health Insurance system 
revealed differences in stakeholders’ dynamics in the policy process (Agyepong, Adjei 2008, 
Rajkotia 2007). The studies have shown that the Ministry of Health (MOH) (political), the 
incumbent political party (then NPP) and politically connected consultants were very strong 
proponents of the policy process. The position of the private sector was between neutral and 
proponents, while the position of MOH (civil service) and donors was between neutral and 
opponents. However, the existing CBHIS were simply opponents while the main opposition 
party (then NDC) and labour unions were very strong opponents of the reform process 
(Rajkotia 2007). The opposition to the policy was mainly centred on either the policy process 
or certain aspects of the content but not the policy idea (Agyepong, Adjei 2008). This implies 
that, in principle, the policy idea was accepted by almost all stakeholders since the “cash and 
carry” (out-of-pocket payment) system was recognised by every Ghanaian as very 
















The then opposition NDC Party (current ruling party) and organised labour supported the 
policy idea but the opposition party strongly opposed the policy process arguing that the 
rapidity of the process was politically motivated while organised labour strongly opposed 
certain aspects of the content especially the deduction of 2.5% from their SSNIT 
contributions to fund the scheme (Agyepong, Adjei 2008, Rajkotia 2007). These opponents 
raised three main concerns: the NHI levy would increase the burden of taxes on Ghanaians; 
the SSNIT deductions could affect the sustainability of the pension scheme; and there weren’t 
adequate health facilities and personnel to ensure equitable access to services under the 
system (Abbey 2003). In particular, the introduction of new forms of taxes like the additional 
VAT has often been associated with actor resistance in Ghana (Addison, Osei 2001). While 
organised labour arranged a few street protests against the policy and threatened to take the 
government to court, the members of the main opposition party after unsuccessfully debating 
against it in parliament boycotted parliamentary proceedings on the day the NHIS bill was 
passed (Abbey 2003). The opposition from organised labour was overcome when the 
government decided to exempt all SSNIT contributors from the payment of a direct premium 
to their DMHIS as compensation for using part of their SSNIT contributions to finance the 
scheme (Agyepong, Adjei 2008). 
As regards stakeholders’ influence over the policy process, it has been documented that the 
MOH (political), the then incumbent political party (NPP) and the politically connected 
consultants had high influence over the process. The influence of labour unions was between 
medium and high, but that of the opposition political party, donors, MOH (civil servants) and 
the private sector was just medium, while the existing CBHIS had low to medium influence 
(Rajkotia 2007). The political actors relied on their political power mandated by the 
constitution to control and drive the policy process. Though technical experts, such as the 
















was weakened by the principle of political neutrality which is the guiding code of conduct for 
civil and public servants in Ghana (Agyepong, Adjei 2008). However, the majority of the 
intended beneficiaries, especially those within the rural informal sector, had very little 
knowledge of what was going on with regard to the policy development (Agyepong, Adjei 
2008). In line with what has been noted by Howlett & Ramesh (2003), all those who had very 
strong influence over the NHIS development process were mainly proponents and wielded 
political power or had connections with political actors. 
Also, in the analysis of health care financing reforms in South Africa, Thomas & Gilson 
(2004) identified the MOH, the unit responsible for health care financing reforms and the 
academic community as the key primary and clearly visible drivers of health insurance 
reforms. Their study revealed that the existence of differences between the reform drivers as 
well as opposition from other actors made it difficult to establish adequate support for the 
adoption of any form of contributory health insurance in South Africa. Those stakeholders 
with higher political status, such as the Minister of Health and the National Treasury and 
those connected to such political figures, had greater influence over the reforms. Other 
stakeholders were reported to have acted in a manner that would protect their interests. The 
National Treasury opposed SHI on the basis of its potential impact on the tax to GDP ratio, 
administrators of private health insurance schemes were concerned with the protection of 
their profits and commercial interest and trade unions also opposed SHI (Gilson et al. 2003).  
It was also noted that technical experts had very limited influence over other health care 
financing reforms in South Africa and Zambia (Gilson et al. 2003). The public, front-line 
implementers and mid-level managers were reported to have greater influence over the 
implementation and success of some reforms in South Africa and Zambia at the time (Gilson 
















Africa, were classified as non-mobilised which means they did not play an identifiable role in 
influencing the process of the policy reforms. 
Concerns about financial sustainability are prevalent in health care financing reforms in 
LMICs.  One example is the case of Kenya, where a national social health insurance fund 
(NSHIF) proposed by the government of Kenya and approved by parliament in 2004, has 
since not received presidential assent because the Minister of Finance deemed it financially 
unsustainable (Maliti 2005, Franker, Hsiao 2007).   
Even in Thailand, despite widespread popularity of the universal coverage reforms among 
stakeholders, Hanvoravongchai & Hsiao (2007) report that a number of stakeholders still 
exhibited some opposition to it and raised concerns about certain aspects of it.  They revealed 
that though the policy got the full approval of the Council of Ministers, medical professionals 
opposed a medical liability clause contained in it. Labour unions opposed the merging of 
their Social Security Fund with funds of the universal coverage scheme. Technical staff 
within the Finance Ministry raised concerns about its long-run financial implications and the 
possible impact of a tax-based programme on the debt burden of the country. Private 
providers also wanted a guarantee that they would benefit from the new system. However, 
since the policy idea was endorsed by all stakeholders, these concerns were readily addressed 
and enabled the policy to be rolled out. 
Although the studies and policy experiences reviewed here revealed interesting actor 
dynamics in health care financing reforms, they were all retrospective in nature drawing data 
from various sources to explain what had already taken place. With regard to health care 
financing reforms, there is little in the literature on prospective analysis within the context of 
















prospective in nature. What has come out clearly in this section is the fact that universal 
coverage reforms usually affect actors’ interests in different ways and, hence, there is always 
bound to be actor opposition to such reforms. The concerns and influences of actors therefore 
need to always be taken into consideration for the reforms to be successful. 
4. Conclusion 
In summary, this literature review has highlighted that universal coverage is internationally 
accepted as the primary goal of health care financing systems. It has two main components: 
universal financial protection and universal access to needed health service. While universal 
access to health care entails the existence of a health system that offers every resident access 
to health care according to need, universal financial protection which is the focus of this 
study is mainly concerned with the protection of individuals against costs from out-of-pocket 
payments for health care. To protect individuals and households against the catastrophic 
effects of out-of-pocket expenditure requires the adoption of prepayment systems such as 
taxes and/or contributory insurance for financing health care. However, neither a tax nor 
contributory health insurance system is a one size fits all model for universal coverage. The 
various forms of taxes and insu ance systems are all instruments to achieve the goal of 
universal financial protection. However, those prepayment systems that are mandatory and 
involve pooling of funds from different sources offer greater opportunities for achieving 
universal financial protection than systems that mainly rely only on taxes or contributory 
insurance.   
Globally, only a few countries have been able to attain universal financial protection. These 
are usually those countries with relatively large formal sectors, but for most low- and middle-
income countries, it has been very difficult to extend coverage to the poor and informal sector 
















that was achieved only after they had changed from a contributory insurance model for the 
informal sector to a fully tax-funded system. The current focus in the universal coverage 
debate is therefore on how coverage within LMICs can be extended to those in their large 
informal sectors. The evidence in the literature points to the fact that it is difficult to enforce 
premium payments in the informal sector and that this has been responsible for the low 
coverage in that sector. The Ghanaian experience of enforcing NHI premiums in the informal 
sector is similar to that of the global experience. LMICs are still being encouraged to explore 
innovative strategies of extending coverage to the informal sectors of their economies. In this 
study, the Ghanaian one-time premium payment (OTPP) policy proposal is therefore 
examined in relation to these broader efforts to explore innovative ways of extending 
coverage to the informal sector within LMICs.  
The literature also reveals that even universal coverage reforms that have widespread 
popularity still face some actor opposition. To be able to think through the acceptability and 
feasibility of universal coverage reforms, such as the proposed one-time premium payment 
policy, requires a prospective stakeholder analysis to explore the likely interest, positions, 
power and influences of various stakeholders on the policy process and implementation. 
However, such prospective stakeholder analyses of health care financing reforms within 
LMICs are seldom done. Since the proposed one-time premium policy is currently at the 
decision stage, this study, which is a prospective stakeholder analysis, seeks not only to 
generate information that will contribute to assessing the feasibility of the proposed policy, 
but also to contribute empirical information in filling this gap in knowledge of prospective 
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Key messages 
 Depending on the interpretation of its meaning and the design of implementation arrangements, a 
one-time premium payment policy has the potential for increased population coverage under 
insurance especially within the informal sector, equity in health care financing and hence universal 
financial protection.. 
 Due to the uncertainties surrounding the policy issue, many powerful stakeholders are yet to take 
clear positions on it, thereby making it difficult to conclude on its feasibility. 
 Lack of stakeholder understanding of the policy concept, the financing and sustainability of the 
policy and excessive politicisation will be the main challenges to its successful implementation and 


















Extending coverage to the informal sector is a key challenge to achieving universal coverage through 
contributory health insurance schemes. Ghana introduced a mandatory National Health Insurance 
system in 2004 to provide financial protection for both the formal and informal sectors through a 
combination of taxes and annual premium payments. As part of its election promise in 2008, the 
current government (then in opposition) promised to make the payment of premium ‘one-time’. This 
has been a very controversial policy issue in Ghana. This study sought to contribute relevant 
information to assessing the feasibility of the proposed policy by exploring the understandings of 
various stakeholders on the policy, their interests/concerns, potential positions, power and influences 
on it as well as the general prospects and challenges for its implementation. The data was gathered 
from a review of relevant documents in the public domain, 28 key informant interviews and 6 focus 
group discussions with key stakeholders in Accra and two other districts. The results show that there 
is a lot of confusion in stakeholders’ understanding of the policy issue and because of the 
uncertainties surrounding it, most powerful stakeholders are yet to take clear positions on it. However, 
stakeholders raised concerns that revolved around issues such as: the meaning of one-time premium 
within an insurance policy, the affordability of the one-time premium, financing and sustainability of 
the policy as well as the impact of such a policy on equity in overall access to health care.  Policy-
makers need to clearly explain the meaning of the one-time premium policy and how it will be funded 
and critically consider the concerns raised by stakeholders before proceeding with further attempts to 
implement it. For other countries planning universal coverage reforms, it is important that the 
terminology of their reforms clearly reflects policy objectives. 
Introduction  
Universal coverage (UC) has globally been recognised as a goal of high priority for every health care 
financing system (WHO 2005b, WHO 2010). It entails universal financial protection and universal 
access to needed health services (McIntyre & Kutzin 2010). Prepaid contributory systems such as 
taxes and insurance, which involve fund and risk pooling, are widely accepted as the key instruments 
















countries, mostly those with large formal sectors, have been able to achieve universal financial 
protection through direct contributory health insurance systems (McIntyre 2007, Carrin & James 
2004, Evans 2007, WHO 2005a). A key challenge of contributory health insurance systems in low- 
and middle-income countries is how to extend coverage to those populations outside the formal sector 
(McIntyre et al. 2008, WHO 2005a, Samson 2009, Hsiao 2007). 
Ghana, a lower-middle income country took a bold step towards universal financial protection in 2004 
when, in an attempt to fulfil its 2000 election promise, the New Patriotic Party (NPP) government 
introduced a mandatory National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) to replace out-of-pocket payments 
for health care called the ‘Cash-and-carry’ system (Government of Ghana 2003, MOH 2004). It was 
designed to cover both formal and informal sector workers concurrently through a combination of 
insurance premiums and taxes but with exemptions for children, the aged and indigents (MOH 2004). 
The main sources of funds to the NHIS are: a 2.5% National Health Insurance (NHI) levy, an 
additional value added tax (VAT); a monthly equivalent  deduction of 2.5% of the payroll from each 
formal sector worker’s contribution to  the Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) 
pension fund; interest from investments made by the scheme; an annual premium contribution from 
all informal sector workers and  those formal sector workers who are not covered by the SSNIT 
pension scheme; and a registration fee paid by all NHIS subscribers to their respective District Mutual 
Health Insurance Schemes (DMHIS) with which they register. The premiums are supposed to be 
structured according to ability-to-pay (NHIA 2009), but due to difficulties in assessing households’ 
income levels, a flat rate is charged by many DMHIS (McIntyre et al. 2008, Jehu-Appiah et al. 2010).  
Services are accessed via a valid NHIS membership identification card. Currently, the registered 
membership population is about 66% (NHIA 2010c, NHIA 2010a), though the population with valid 
NHIS cards is 50% (MOH, 2010). The tax component (NHI levy) contributes  69.5% of the total 
funding to the NHIS, SSNIT deductions 23.2%, informal sector premiums only 5.1% and other 
income constitute 2.2% of the total funds for the NHIS (Results for Development Institute & Adjei 
2010). Studies show that many of those who are not yet covered under the NHIS are the poor and 
















(Gyapong et al. 2007, MOH 2009, Oxfam et al. 2011, Akazili 2010, Asante & Aikins 2008, Ansah et 
al. 2009, Jehu-Appiah et al. 2011).  
 It is perhaps against the above background that in 2008, the NDC (then in opposition) in its election 
Manifesto promised to “implement a Universal Health Insurance Scheme which will reflect the 
universal contribution of all Ghanaian residents to the Scheme. Our universal Health Insurance 
scheme will guarantee access to free health care in all public health institutions. It will be listed in the 
health insurance schedule, will not be district-specific and will allow for one-time premium payment 
for registration with the scheme.....” (NDC Manifesto 2008: 68). Since coming into power in January 
2009, the government has consistently indicated its commitment to implementing the one-time 
premium payment (OTPP) system, though there is currently no policy document in the public domain 
on it (NHIA 2010c, NHIA 2010b, MOH 2009). The one-time premium has since attracted lots of 
controversy in the Ghanaian media as regards its feasibility. However, no formal study on the 
perceptions and potential stance of various stakeholders on the policy issue has yet been published. 
This study therefore sought to contribute information to assessing the feasibility of formulating and 
implementing the proposed policy by exploring the perceptions (understandings) of various 
stakeholders about the proposed policy and assessing their interest/concerns, potential positions, 
power relations and influences on the implementation of the policy through a stakeholder analysis.  
The study also highlights the potential prospects and challenges for the formulation and/or 
implementation of the policy and hence its potential impact on achieving universal coverage and 
lessons that can be learned from this Ghanaian experience. 
Conceptual framework  
In this paper, it is postulated that stakeholders’ understanding of the policy issue affects what they 
perceive as its impact on them (stakeholders interest), their interest influences their positions on the 
policy and drawing on the power they possess, stakeholders will seek to defend their interest by 
influencing the policy based on the nature of their position (see Figure 1). The interest of a 
















could either be positive or negative (Thomas & Gilson 2004, Roberts et al. 2008), or the advantages 
and disadvantages that will occur to the stakeholder as a result of the implementation of the policy 
(Schmeer 2000).  Stakeholders’ position refers to their potential support or opposition to the policy 
issue (Thomas & Gilson 2004, Brugha & Varvasovszky 2000), while stakeholders’ power is their 
ability to influence a policy (Thomas & Gilson 2004) either at the level of policy formulation and/or 
implementation. This study is basically a stakeholder analysis with the emphasis on actor mobilisation 
around the policy issue. The study examined actor dynamics in relation to the overall formulation and 
potential implementation of the policy, drawing on issues about the potential policy content, the 
















Figure 1: Conceptual framework for analysising the potential influence of stakeholders on the proposed OTPP of Ghana
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coverage 
STAKEHOLDERS’ CHARACTERISTICS STAKEHOLDERS’ INFLUENCE ON POLICY 
IMPLICATIONS FOR POLICY 
FORMULATION/IMPLEMENTATION 














































This was a qualitative cross-sectional study that explored the opinions of various stakeholders on the 
proposed one-time NHIS premium payment policy in Ghana. The data was collected between November 
2010 and February 2011 in Accra - the national capital, Akuapim South district, an urban district in the 
southern part of Ghana and Kassena-Nankana West District, a relatively rural district in the northern part 
of Ghana. The data was gathered from three main sources to allow for triangulation (Mack et al. 2005, 
Silverman 2006). These were: face-to-face key informant interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs) 
and a review of media reports from 2008 to February, 2011. The key informant interviews were 
successfully administered to national level policy actors such as politicians  of the ruling party- the 
chairman of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Health and a leading member of the NDC who is 
also a board member of the NHIA, opposition politicians- ranking member  on health (NPP) and an 
opposition member of parliament, technocrats in the form of staff of the Ghana Health Service, 
academics - lecturers and health researchers,  labour unions - leaders of Trade Union Congress (TUC) 
and Ghana Registered  Nurses Association, and district level front-line policy implementers (staff of 
DMHIS - a scheme manager, public relation officers and claims managers, and health workers - a 
medical assistant, nurses, pharmacists, hospital administrator and accountants). The FGDs were 
conducted with NHIS (or potential) beneficiaries at the community level in the two districts. Stakeholders 
were selected through purposive and snowball sampling techniques due to the nature of the study and 
difficulty in easily identifying and getting access to the most important stakeholders respectively (Mack 
et al. 2005). However, because of the political sensitivity of the topic, some stakeholders (all staff of the 
ministries and NHIA and one DMHIS staff) did not consent to the interviews and hence their opinions 
were not obtained. Other national-level policy actors were willing to participate but were too busy to 
make time for the interviews. Notwithstanding the above, the views of policy actors such as the Minister 
(and deputies) of health, former directors of health services and civil society organisations that could not 
be obtained through interviews were captured from media reports. In all, 28 key informant interviews and 
6 FGDs were carried out. The size of each FGD ranged from 9 to 11. Stakeholders were asked to give 
















issue. All interviews and FGDs were tape recorded, transcribed and analysed using thematic analysis with 
major themes derived from the conceptual framework of the study. The results are presented in tables, 
diagrams, boxes and on a force-field analysis map.  
Results  
Stakeholders’ awareness and understanding of OTPP policy 
The results show that, there is a very high level of stakeholder awareness on the proposed OTPP policy. 
The 2008 NDC manifesto and the electioneering campaigns, public statements by politicians and key 
staff of the NHIA, and radio discussions were reported as the main sources of information on the OTPP. 
No gender differences were observed in stakeholders’ awareness of the policy issue. The respondents in 
the urban district were, however, more aware of the policy issue than those in the rural area. This could 
be due to the intense political activities and better access to modern communication networks such as 
radio broadcasting that exist in urban areas. 
 It was also revealed that there was a lot of confusion regarding stakeholders’ understanding of the 
proposed policy. This confusion is more intense among potential beneficiaries at the community level. 
Though almost all stakeholders reported no clear understanding of the proposed policy, a range of 
possible meanings as illustrated in Figure 2 were revealed from the explanations stakeholders gave on 





























Though the manifesto did not clearly state whether the OTPP entails life-time or periodic payments, what 
is often captured in the press and was reported by all the national level policy actors, many front-line 
policy implementers and some potential beneficiaries is that of life-time payments. Only a few health 
workers in the rural district and some potential beneficiaries felt it could entail paying once-off every five 
years. Most of those who reported the five-year cycles however thought the new national NHIS identity 
card system, which is valid for five years but renewable every year, was the same as the proposed OTPP. 
Others were aware of the difference but argued that paying once-off for life is not feasible: 
“I don’t understand the whole idea of the one-time. If you pay once and not pay again, then what 
will they use to buy drugs for us since we would not pay again? My understanding is that you pay 
again in five years time otherwise they won’t get money to buy drugs to treat us or the 
government will buy the drugs for us free?” (Woman, FGD, Rural). 
 
However, as a form of life-time payment, the following box illustrates the understandings of stakeholders 
on what the OTPP system may look like. 
 
Pay once-off for life (life-time 
payment: no renewals) 
Pay once –off every five years 
(periodic repayments and 
renewals) 
Pay an actual insurance 
premium: implies paying an 
actuarially calculated premium 
based on the net present value 
(NPV) of all future premiums 
(life-expectancy discounts) 
 
Pay just a registration fee:   
 paying the current 
premium rate  
 paying an amount slightly 
higher but affordable  
Pay five years 
premium: implies 
paying the net present 
value (NPV) of five years 
worth of the current premium 



























                                                                                                                                                                                
 
The notion of paying the NPV of all future premiums was mainly held by opposition politicians, 
technocrats and some academics. Politicians of the ruling party, civil society organisations, most front-
line implementers and potential beneficiaries expect that as a campaign promise, the OTPP will involve 
low payments (paying just a registration fee). Though the manifesto stated that the OTPP will provide 
free health care to all residents, neither the manifesto nor the policy-makers have clearly indicated how it 
will be financed. The policy idea also seems to put an emphasis on an insurance premium as it is called a 
one-time “premium” payment. There are currently therefore a lot of uncertainties with regard to how it 
will be financed. This confusion gets worse with the recent statement by the Chief Executive Officer of 
the NHIA that they are considering running a parallel system of OTPP alongside annual premiums and 
individuals will be allowed to belong to the one of their choice (Gadugah 2011).  Technocrats, academics 
and opposition politicians were therefore of the opinion that even the policy-drivers are confused about 
the policy concept and argue that it is the name “one-time premium” that makes the policy issue unclear. 
“From what the government is saying, the meaning is not clear but from my personal 
understanding, one-time premium payment is really not insurance, if it is just about paying a 
registration fee then that becomes like a National Health Service  like akin to the British but if it 
A complete removal of informal sector 
premiums 
 Minimal (nominal) initial payment from the 
informal sector as a registration fee 
Health care in all accredited health facilities 
becomes free like existed in the 1960s 
 No longer an insurance scheme but a publicly 
funded system (tax-based system) 
Government will have to raise additional 
funding elsewhere for the running of the NHIS 
The role of the NHIA becomes that of a third 
party payer 
It means premium payment will be maintained 
but paid for once to cover entire life time 
Implies substantial initial premium payment  
 Those who can pay the accumulated amount 
will be covered and the rest will have to 
continue with the cash-and-carry system 
The system will continue to operate as a life-
time premium based insurance scheme 
Premiums will be relied upon for the running of 
the scheme 
The NHIA maintains it current role  
















is about paying the premium one- time, then it means that they would have done the actuarial 
studies to be able to calculate how much you are supposed to pay till you die” (Opposition 
politician) 
“I don’t understand it ………… it is a political nonsense. It doesn’t conform to any health 
insurance, if it is a tax-based system, I would understand it but not under the National Health 
Insurance System” (Academic) 
 
Stakeholder’s interest and potential positions on the proposed OTPP policy  
Stakeholders’ interest and potential positions varied in relation to the two main meanings of the OTPP 
that were derived from their understanding of the policy issue.  
OTPP as paying the net present value of all future premiums as a single payment 
Stakeholders generally had similar interest/concerns and positions on this option. They generally feel this 
option will be unaffordable for many Ghanaians and hence it was clear that it is not likely that there will 
be any significant stakeholder support for an OTPP if it will result in amounts (premiums) that are 
significantly higher than the current premium. The reasons that stakeholders gave for their potential non-





























It is therefore important to note that since this option was regarded by stakeholders as the least feasible 
option, the rest of the analysis presented here are based on the interpretation that the OTPP involves low 
payments. 
OTPP as paying just a registration fee (low payments)          
In relation to this, stakeholders showed varied interest in the OTPP. The positive issues that stakeholders 
raised were around its potential impact on population coverage under insurance and equity in access to 
health care. What stakeholders had doubts about was how it will be financed, sustained and operated 
efficiently. In general, those stakeholders that had negative concerns about it were more likely to be 
opponents, those that had positive views proponents and those who were not certain about its possible 
impact had conditional positions or were non-mobilised as illustrated in Table 1 below and the force-field 
analysis presented in the next section. 
Box 2: Reasons for potential non-acceptance of an OTPP rate that is 
significantly higher than the current premium rate 
It will be unaffordable to most Ghanaians, reduce the number of people on 
insurance, and make the NHIS pro-rich and inequitable 
The electorate will feel deceived since they were promised free health care  
It will be catastrophic and further impoverish many potential beneficiaries  
It involves high risk as potential beneficiaries feel they may lose a lot if one pays 
and suddenly dies or a different government comes to change it.  
It is strange in insurance policy and not practiced anywhere in the world 
Paying a huge amount is not a guarantee that the quality of services received 
from providers will be improved 
The amount that will be generated from the premiums alone will not be enough 
to run the scheme without subsidies from taxes  

















Table 1: Overall perceived impact of the OTPP on stakeholders and their potential position on the policy (if amount is low) 




Key interest/concerns of stakeholders motivating stakeholder’s overall perceived impact of policy 
and their potential positions 
Politicians of 
the ruling party 
Strongly positive Very high 
 support 
They are the originators, initiators and drivers of the policy issue and implementing it will help them 
fulfil their campaign promise and make the NHIS more equitable and pro-poor. 
Opposition 
political parties  
Strongly negative Very high 
opposition 
Feels it is politically motivated and will only lead to an increase in taxes and the collapse of the NHIS  
because it will be economically unsustainable since the 1960s tax-funded public health care collapsed  




Neutral because they are civil servants but opponents because they are concerned about its 
feasibility, efficiency and sustainability 





Some  are opponents because they feel the concept is strange in insurance policy parlance and may 
be unsustainable, but others are non-mobilised because they feel, depending on how it is designed, it 
can bring equity in health care financing  




Not sure if it can be sustained without increasing the burden of indirect taxes 
Civil society 
organisations  
Strongly positive High support  It will relieve the poor of the financial burden of health care and promote equity in access to health 
care 













They feel it will increase NHIS coverage and may not necessarily  affect the running of DMHIS  if 
additional revenue can be mobilised to support it, but they are not sure of how it will be financed and 
whether there will be prompt transfer of centrally pooled funds to the scheme, and also concerned 
about their job security 
They may lose their jobs when renewal of premiums is taken away 
Health workers 
(clinical) 
Slightly positive Support It will enhance the welfare of their clients but their support may not  be very strong because it may 







They are not sure of its potential impact on claims payment and hence, internally generated fund.  
Private 
pharmacist 
Negative Opponent Opponents because it may collapse their business or delay claims payment, but their opposition may 
not be very strong because they are accredited to the NHIS and they also stand to benefit in terms of 




 Not direct/ uncertain  Highly 
divided  
Some may support it because it will relieve them  of annual  payments for their relatives; non-
mobilised because they are not sure of its effect on tax burden; and opponents because they feel their 




Strongly positive  High 
support   
It will offer them unlimited financial access to health care and relieve them of the physical and 
psychological stress associated with yearly renewal of payments, but their support may not be 
extremely high because of fears that it can lead to poor quality of care and they also don’t trust its 
















 Box 3 contains key quotations from stakeholders’ responses that illustrate their interest and potential positions on 
the OTPP as captured in Table 1 above. 
Box 3: Key quotations from stakeholders’ responses that illustrate their interest and potential position on 













Stakeholders’ power and potential influence over OTPP 
Assessment and mapping of stakeholders’ power  
An assessment of the power of stakeholders in relation to their ability to influence the formulation, implementation 
and/or overall success of the OTPP is illustrated in Table 2.  The assessment was based on information gathered from 
stakeholders’ opinions and secondary data from published studies (Agyepong & Adjei 2008, Rajkotia 2007). A 
mapping of the overall estimated power (in the entire policy process) of each category of stakeholder in relation to 
their positions to give an indication of their potential influence on the policy, if the OTPP will not result into amounts 
that are significantly higher than the current premium, is presented in the force-field analysis (Figure 3).  It must be 
noted that in general, national level policy actors have greater potential power and influence over the formulation, 
front-line implementers over the implementation and potential beneficiaries over the success and survival of the 
policy. 
“In as much as my re-imbursement will come regularly, I don’t think it will affect my work” (Administrator, 
health facility) 
 “For us we do not think it is going to impact directly on us because we don’t go out there to collect the 
money from the clients. We pick it from the insurance authority, so long as they have done their 
mathematics and they know that it is workable, we will always take our money from them. We don’t crack 
our heads about how you want to raise the money, we take it” (Accountant, health facility) 
“It is going to close down community pharmacies because doctors and nurses are saying that they must 
generate their internal fund (IGF) to support the health sector and because pharmacists are not prescribers 
and since every hospital has its own pharmacy, the clinicians would prescribe drugs that can be obtained 
from the public pharmacies and since with one-time premium many people may be under insurance, the 
business of community pharmacist will collapse” (private pharmacist, urban).  
 
“We give a condition and we are not strongly against it, we only raise concerns about whether it will be 
sustainable. If it will be sustainable and we have means of ensuring that we don’t bother Ghanaians with 
extra indirect taxes then of course we are in for it” (Trade Union Congress) 
 “Nurses need to have a clear understanding of the policy before taking a position on it. We are not sure 

















Table 2: Procedural assessment of stakeholders power and ability to influence the  formulation and/or implementation of the OTPP  



















































of power  
Ruling party 
politicians 
√√√√  √√√ √√√√  √√√√ √√√ √√√ √√√√  √√√ Very high 
Opposition 
parties 
  √√    √√√ √√√ √√  √√ Medium/High 
Technocrats     √√√√ √√√   √√ √ √√ Medium/high 
Academics     √√√√  √√     Low/medium 
Labour unions  √√    √√ √√√ √√√√ √√√   High 
Civil society 
Organisations 
 √   √√  √√√ √√ √   medium 
 staff of DMHIs 
(permanent) 
    √√√  √   √√√√ √√ Medium/High 
Premium 
collectors 
         √  Very low 
Health workers 
(clinical) 
    √√√√  √√√ √√√ √√√ √√√√ √√√ High 
Health workers 
(administrative) 
    √√√√  √ √√√ √ √√√ √√ High 
 Private 
pharmacists 
    √√√√  √√ √√ √√ √√√ √√ High 
Informal sector 
workers 
 √√√√     √    √√√√ Very high 
SSNIT 
contributors  
 √√√     √√ √   √ Higher 
Medium 
Note The no. of ticks implies level of power and potential ability to influence the policy. √√√√ implies very high; √√√ implies high; √√ implies medium; √ implies low and no tick implies no recognised 
power (potential limitation on the ability of the stakeholder to influence the policy) 
  Though the others sources of stakeholder power are self explanatory, ability to determine policy success and continuity refers to how a stakeholder’s acceptance or rejection of the policy can directly 
affect policy sustainability and the realisation of policy goals.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            
Though informal sector workers do not have many ticks relative to some other stakeholders, their power mainly serves as a limitation to the power of other powerful stakeholders and is very key in the 

















Figure 3. Force field Analysis: The potential power and positions of stakeholders (if OTPP is not significantly higher than current premium rate) 
STAKEHOLDERS’ 
POSITION 
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Description of potential influence of stakeholders 
From the force-field analysis, the party in government (politicians) is the main proponent of the OTPP 
and possess very high power. They have political and constitutional legitimacy to initiate the policy, a 
parliamentary majority to secure parliamentary approval and control over the economic resources of 
the state needed for the policy implementation. They may be limited by lack of technical knowledge 
to design and enforce its implementation and limited resources to make design and implementation 
possible.  They will therefore have to directly involve technocrats who possess the technical expertise 
required for the design of the policy. These technocrats are, however, opponents of the policy issue 
but their influence may not be visible because of limitations imposed by the civil service code of 
conduct.  They can still covertly influence the content of the policy. Hence, the policy-drivers may 
have to act cautiously when involving technocrats in the design of the policy. 
If the policy-makers choose to act in the interest of the informal sector workers, who constitute the 
majority of the Ghanaian voters, by fixing a nominal amount for the OTPP, they may obtain their full 
support and the support of civil society organisations for the policy.  By virtue of the fact that this 
policy issue is a political initiative and has been highly politicised, it will be the voting power of the 
electorate and their acceptance of it that will determine its ultimate survival. The informal sector 
therefore possesses a potentially very high level of power in relation to the survival and success of the 
policy since informal sector workers constitute the largest population of voters in Ghana and would be 
the direct beneficiaries of the OTPP. However, informal sector beneficiaries in reality have often not 
had much influence over social policy formulation in Ghana (e.g. with the establishment of the NHIS) 
(Agyepong & Adjei 2008). Their actual influence on the formulation of the policy may therefore not 
be high. A possible opportunity exists for an alliance between informal sector beneficiaries and civil 
society organisations (CSOs) as both may be supporters of the policy if the OTPP does not involve 
substantial payments. This alliance can give a voice to beneficiaries, increase their awareness level on 
the policy issue and their ability to influence the policy through an informed exercise of their political 
















come together to strongly demand that government strictly goes by the social contract of providing 
free health care for all and by influencing voters’ opinion.  Also, some CSOs usually have technical 
expertise, financial resources and international connections to support policy implementation.  They 
can therefore rally behind the government through advocacy and research or use their international 
connections to attract international funds to support the implementation of the policy. 
As potential supporters, health workers (clinical) may be a key source of education on the OTPP to 
potential beneficiaries and may also encourage their patients to register with the scheme. But, since 
they are not strong proponents of the policy, if nothing is done to mitigate the increased workload and 
stress the policy will bring to them, they may turn to behave rudely to insured clients (such as 
deliberately delaying seeing patients, shouting at them, going on long breaks etc) (Erasmus & Gilson 
2008). Local-level health workers generally possess professional knowledge and interact directly with 
patients and are therefore at the centre of the successful implementation of the policy. With their 
discretionary powers, they can undermine or facilitate the implementation of the policy by their 
behaviour towards insured clients (Hudson 2009, Lipsky 2010) and hence they have a high power to 
influence the policy.  
Apart from technocrats, potential opposition to the proposed policy may come from the opposition 
political parties, accredited NHIS private pharmacists and the NHIS premium collectors. The 
premium collectors may have very little influence over the policy because their power is very low. As 
the main opponents, the opposition politicians may try to block its passage into a law and its 
subsequent implementation, but their power may be limited by their lack of a parliamentary majority, 
and they must also act in the interests of the electorate. However, as a vibrant opposition in 
parliament, they can influence public opinion, especially that of their supporters, against the policy 
and may strongly resist and delay its passage into law. The policy may finally be passed without 
parliamentary consensus. However, they may not continue with its implementation if they happen to 
win the next political election which is due in 2012.  Also, with their potentially high power, if the 
















claims, they may withdraw their accreditation with the NHIS and encourage insured clients to 
continue to buy drugs out-of-pocket from them, since they are located close to clients and interact 
regularly with them. They may also remain accredited with the scheme but fraudulently over bill 
customers in order to make more profits and this can affect the financial sustainability of the scheme.  
Most stakeholders with potentially medium to high power currently have no clear (certain) positions 
on the policy and their influence may therefore be conditional on the content or design of the policy.  
If the labour unions perceive that the policy will not be sustainable without an increased burden of 
taxes, they may organise their members to demonstrate against it or form an alliance with other 
opponents to oppose it. Their power is high because they are well organised, have control over their 
members in formal sector employment and the Trade Union Congress (TUC) is represented on the 
NHIA board.   
The permanent staff of the DMHIS can influence the overall implementation of the OTPP at the 
district level.  If it is clearly proven that implementing it will not affect the sustainability of the 
scheme, they will become strong proponents of it and hence will facilitate its implementation by 
giving effective client education on the policy, preventing fraud and ensuring that clients and 
providers are fully satisfied with the services received from them. However, if they perceive that its 
implementation will negatively affect the operations of the DMHIS, although they may not be able to 
openly oppose it because they are civil servants, they may secretly undermine its implementation by 
deliberately delaying claims processing and payment and issuance of membership cards or poor 
treatment of clients. Also, the influence of health workers (administrative) will depend on how 
promptly their claims will be paid under the OTPP. Health facility administrators have control over 
health facilities and hence can withdraw services provided to insured clients and demand out-of-
pocket payments from clients if the scheme is unable to pay their claims.   
Academics and formal sector employees are the groups that appeared to be divided on the policy 
issue. Academics generally possess academic and technical knowledge on the policy issue, however, 
















have low influence over health care financing policy (Agyepong & Adjei 2008, Rajkotia 2007, Gilson 
et al. 2003). Notwithstanding this, those who are currently opponents can influence public opinion 
against it through their prolific writings or public discussions in the media. The non-mobilised may 
become supporters depending on how the policy will be designed. Though formal sector workers are a 
more organised and educated population than the informal sector premium contributors, their power 
may not be as high as that of the informal sector workers as illustrated on the force-field analysis map 
in determining the success of the policy since they may not be the direct target of the policy. If their 
leadership accepts the policy, they may not individually be able to influence. However, they could be 
key sources of education on the policy at the local level (especially teachers). 
The prospects and challenges for OTPP’s formulation/ implementation and hence 
universal coverage 
Table 3 summarises the opinions of stakeholders on the prospects and challenges for the formulation 
and/or implementation of the proposed OTPP and hence universal coverage, and the 

















Table 3: The prospects and challenges for formulating and/or implementing OTPP idea and hence universal 
coverage 
Issue Prospects Challenges Recommendation4 
The policy 
idea 
It is in line with international 
calls for efforts to extend 
financial protection to the poor 
and informal sector workers 
 Lack of clarity on the policy 
concept has led to confusion 
among stakeholders and hence 
uncertain stakeholder positions 
on the policy issue 
Policy-makers should be 
clear on the definition of 
the OTPP. If it is to be 
implemented there must be 
effective public education 








Can rely on proceeds from oil 
revenue   
 
 
Can increase NHI levy, increase 
sin taxes on alcohol and 
tobacco, let corporate bodies 
pay NHI levy  
Seek support from donors  
 
 Increase budgetary allocations 
to NHIS 
Oil revenue is not reliable 
because it is a finite resource and  
oil prices are not stable 
 
Introduction of new taxes may be 
resisted 
 
The donor community does not 
contribute much to the current 
NHIS and hence, cannot be relied 
upon to support an OTPP. 
Government has a limited ability 
to raise additional revenue 
Government should be 
honest and tell Ghanaians 
that it will be tax-funded. 
Hence, fund it from 







Premium constitutes a small 
proportion of NHIS revenue 
(about 5%) and hence removing 
it may not negatively affect the 
NHIS.  
It will be difficult to determine an 
affordable one-time premium 
There is inadequate technical and 
administrative capacity to run it 
Difficult to obtain the support of 
all stakeholders for the policy 
Poor  identification system and 
data base on population and 
disease burden makes it difficult 
to predict future health care cost  
 Results of feasibility 
studies on it should be 
released for public 
assessment 
The national identification 
exercise should be 
completed and birth and 
death registration 





If the premium is affordable, 
more people will be enroll d 
into the NHIS  
If  the premium rate is high, it 
will reduce the number of people 
under NHIS 
The OTPP must not be 
significantly higher than 




Can reduce the level of out-of-
pocket payments (OOP) if many 
are able to enrol  
If the number of people on 
insurance reduces, the cash and 
carry system may re-emerge or  
if there are delays in claims 
payment, providers will  charge 
informal fees  
 Ensure that claims under 





If it is tax-funded, it will 
improve progressivity in health 
care financing as informal 
sector premiums are currently 
regressive while VAT and direct 
taxes are progressive in Ghana 
(Akazili 2010), and  the poor 
If the initial payment is 
substantial, the NHIS will become 
more regressive and pro-rich in 
enrolment  
Make the premium rate 
affordable and ensure that 
exemption  from making 
the OTPP for the poor and 
vulnerable is effectively 
implemented 
                                                          
4
 The recommendations are based on stakeholders’ views.  Not all are therefore necessarily in line with the 
















will enrol and also benefit from 






Because it is a political 
campaign promise, the current 
government will be committed 
to its implementation 
People do not trust that 
subsequent governments will be 
committed to its sustainability 




Its implementation should 
not be rushed. Depoliticise 
it. The public must be 
adequately informed   
about the policy design 
and informed public 




Generally doubted by 
stakeholders 
It may be difficult to sustain in the 
event of economic difficulties 
since the Ghanaian population 
grows faster than the economy 
 
A tax-based system was 
previously introduced in Ghana 
but could not be sustained 
 
Actuarial studies reveals that 
even without the OTPP, the NHIS 
reserves will be depleted by 2016 
(Adu-Gyamerah 2010) 
Carry out more 
independent studies to 
establish its long-term 
financially viability 
 or 
Maintain the current 
system and only identify 
the poor and indigents to 
make a one-time 
registration with continued 
payment for this group 




If affordable, it can increase 
financial access to health care 
and hence increase utilisation 
of health services 
 
Limited health facilities and 
personnel can lead to 
overcrowding, poor attitude of 
health personnel and a general 
poor quality of services. There 
will still be spatial inequities in 
access to health services since 
facilities are not evenly 
distributed 
Before implementing the 
OTPP, more health 
personnel need to be 
trained and out-migration 
checked. Health facilities 
should also be expanded  
and  more established in 
underserved areas   
Impact on 
efficiency 
in the use 
of health 
services 
Can check demand-side moral 
hazard since, it can prevent 
people from seeking health care 
just because their cards are 
near expiring and hence feel 
their money will go to waste if 
they don’t use the card within 
the year 
If tax-funded, it can lead to 
“unnecessary use” on the 
demand side and supply-induced 
demand (SID) on the supply side, 
and a loss of ownership of the 
scheme by clients and clients may 
not value the services received 
under the OTPP  
Capitation should be 
implemented to limit SID 
Proper primary care gate 
keeping  should be 
enforced under the OTPP  
 Introduce periodic 
renewals with minimal 
payments to give a sense 
of ownership        
Discussion  
It must be noted that since the debate on the OTPP is ongoing, the opinions of stakeholders may 
change as fresh information on the policy issue is released to the public. The findings of this study 
may therefore not hold beyond the time frame of the data collection period. Besides, because of the 
absence of a policy document at the time of the study, the views captured in this study could have 
















combined information on policy formulation and potential implementation, the stakeholder analysis 
has not exclusively focused on each distinctive stage of the policy process. The study therefore does 
not clearly reveal the potential difference in actor dynamics that may exist at different stages of the 
policy process.   These are however peculiar problems with prospective stakeholder analysis of this 
nature (Thomas & Gilson 2004, Brugha & Varvasovszky 2000, Varavasovszky & Brugha 2000). 
Despite the above limitations, there are important findings in relation to the study objectives and 
conceptual framework that can inform policy-makers on the opinions of a wide range of stakeholders 
on the proposed OTPP, and lessons from the Ghanaian experience can inform future universal 
coverage reforms within Ghana and other LMICs. 
One of the key findings of this study is that though stakeholders are highly aware of the proposed 
policy, there is currently lots of confusion in their understanding of it.  This perhaps is because the 
policy issue was not made very clear in the NDC election manifesto and has not subsequently been 
well communicated to the public. Also, some stakeholders cannot understand how an insurance 
scheme will be run on a one-time premium basis. 
 This confusion in stakeholder understanding has led to several interpretations and likely 
misinterpretations of the meaning of the concept OTPP. The varied understandings of stakeholders 
offer some policy options for an OTPP. These include: An OTPP which involves paying an actual 
life-time premium calculated as the net present value of all future premiums; an OTPP based on a free 
health care model (tax-funded) requiring only nominal direct payments for registration; and an OTPP 
that takes the form of either the first or second options but renewable every 5 years. The third option 
is not a mutually exclusive policy option but it raises an issue for policy consideration as regards 
whether there is the need for periodic renewals of the insurance membership ID card within an OTPP. 
While some may argue that due to the absence of an effective national database and system of 
identification, periodic renewals may be necessary for updating the membership status of the NHIS 
under the OTPP, others may however, argue that if there will be no regular payments of the 
















The first two forms of stakeholder understandings had great influences over the interests and positions 
of various stakeholders on the policy issue. Stakeholders generally view the first option as “a non-
starter” because it will be unaffordable and a diversion from the campaign promise which put 
emphasis on access to free health care in all public facilities. Most stakeholders will, therefore, not 
support its implementation and it is not likely that it will be feasible to implement the policy if it will 
result in premiums that are significantly higher than the current premium rates. This policy option 
may therefore have an overall negative impact on universal financial protection since it may shift 
many people out of insurance, increase out-of-pocket expenditure on health care and widen inequities 
in access to health care.  
The second option was considered more realistic but stakeholders still had various concerns about a 
solely tax-funded OTPP. For the politicians, their interest seems to be more on how it  will affect their 
political fortunes; for the technocrats, its effects on the sustainability and efficiency in the operation of 
the scheme; for academics, it is contrary to their understanding of the concept ‘insurance’ but is 
favourable in terms of equity in health care financing; for frontline implementers, its effects on their 
occupational and/or professional stability; and for civil society organisations and beneficiaries, its 
effects on beneficiaries’ ability-to-pay and equity in access to health care. The positions of 
stakeholders on this option therefore vary according to what they perceived as its likely overall impact 
on their interest. Those stakeholders in the political stream seem to have clear perceptions of its 
impacts on their interest and hence have clearer positions on it. This perhaps was a reflection of the 
general politicisation of the policy issue. But, due to the uncertainties surrounding the policy issue, 
most powerful stakeholders were generally not sure of how it will be financed (what taxes or public 
funds would be used) and sustained. Hence, stakeholders such as labour unions and front-line 
implementers (the staff of the DMHIS and health workers) with high discretionary powers and whose 
behaviour can facilitate or undermine the successful implementation of the policy (Erasmus & Gilson 
2008, Hudson 2009, Lipsky 2010), have not yet taken a clear stance on it. This makes it very difficult 
to conclude whether it will be feasible to implement the OTTP or not, even if it takes the form of a 
















on the amount that will be fixed as a one-time premium, the sources of funds to support it and 
evidence on its financial sustainability. These are therefore issues that should be given critical 
attention in the preparation of the policy as they will be key in determining the feasibility of a tax-
funded OTPP and its overall prospects for achieving universal financial protection.  
Stakeholder dynamics with regards to the OTPP (especially at the level of policy formulation) may 
therefore not differ so much from what was reported during the introduction of the NHIS since 
political figures are still likely to have the greatest influence over the policy process (Agyepong & 
Adjei 2008, Rajkotia 2007, Howlett & Ramesh 2003). The only difference may be that potential 
beneficiaries are more aware of the OTPP debate than the debates with regard to the introduction of 
the NHIS (Agyepong & Adjei 2008) and are very interested in the policy issue because of its potential 
impact on the benefits they currently enjoy from the NHIS.  In general, the following implications can 
be drawn from the findings of this study for future universal coverage reforms in Ghana and other 
LMICs.  
Firstly, though political campaign promises offer windows of opportunity for moving towards 
universal coverage as happened in Thailand (Tangcharoensathein et al. 2011, Jongudomsuk 2007, 
Hanvoravongchai & Hsiao 2007), those campaign promises in themselves are potential sources of 
actor opposition to intended policy reforms, if the policy process is not managed well. A considerable 
part of the confusion on the OTPP is perhaps due to the fact that it was a campaign promise that may 
bring political advantage to a particular political party if implemented or not. This political rivalry 
between the two main political parties, NDC and NPP, was even reported in 2003 with the 
introduction of the NHIS, which was also a campaign promise by the NPP (Agyepong & Adjei 2008). 
It may therefore not be surprising that, as the OTPP was also as a campaign promise by the NDC, 
members of the NPP may oppose it on political grounds. On the other hand, it also implies that the 
policy initiators may also tend to consider the concerns of the opponents as mere political propaganda 
















of consensus on the initiation of universal coverage reforms which becomes a threat to the continued 
existence of political will for policy sustainability in the event of a change in government.  
Also, the terminology of universal coverage reforms in themselves are potential sources of confusion 
about intended reforms. The name “one-time premium” is central to the confusion on the policy issue. 
Reforms bearing unfamiliar titles like one-time premium usually do not capture clearly the objectives 
of the reform and hence lend themselves to misinterpretation. This confusion with concepts used in 
universal coverage reforms was also recently reported in South Africa, with the term NHI being used 
in their recent proposed health care financing reforms for a system that will be tax-funded (McIntyre 
2010). This is because people usually understand the concept of insurance to mean a system that is 
operated on the basis of renewable premium payments (Kutzin 2007) and hence any system that 
challenges this belief system of stakeholders will generally be resisted (Weible 2006). Other scholars 
however argue that insurance does not necessarily mean the existence of an insurance scheme that 
people make direct payments to, but as indicated by Gupta can refer to any financing arrangement that 
“can help defer, delay, reduce or altogether avoid payment for health care incurred by individuals 
and households” (Gupta 2007: 111). This implies that even a fully tax-funded or what is often called a 
“free” health care system also serves as an instrument for achieving the insurance objective (Kutzin 
2007). 
 In reality, if the OTPP is intended to be a single payment of net present value of all future premiums, 
it is a strange concept as there is no evidence of any country that has ever successfully implemented 
such a system. However, using tax revenue to fully fund the contributions of the informal sector is not 
strange as countries like Thailand have achieved universal coverage under such a system 
(Tangcharoensathein et al. 2011, Jongudomsuk 2007, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2007). Other 
countries such as Kyrgyzstan and Moldova have also adopted this strategy for universal coverage 
(Kutzin et al. 2009, Yang & Holst 2007). The South African NHI proposal is also similar to this 
option (McIntyre 2010). What is more important is that the tax-funded approach is currently viewed 
















enforcing premium contributions in the informal sector has often not been effective (WHO 2010, 
WHO 2005a, Samson 2009). The fruitless debate about terminology should be ended by the 
government clearly stating its policy design intensions. 
Also, the Ghanaian historical experience of health care financing has an influence on stakeholders’ 
perceptions about the merits of the intended OTPP. Stakeholders were generally afraid that if the 
OTPP entails paying just a nominal registration fee, the country may be taken back to the free health 
care system of the 1960s, which some stakeholders argued was abandoned because it could not be 
sustained (Ramachandra & Hsiao 2007, Agyepong et al. 2011). On the other hand, if it is not 
affordable then the “cash and carry system” may become even more widespread in Ghana. The desire 
to do away with out-of-pocket (OOP) payments is seen as a major requirement for moving towards 
universal financial protection and hence this argument is in line with the current debates for the 
prospects of universal coverage (WHO 2010, Evans 2007, Mathauer 2009). This is because empirical 
evidence has shown that OOP payments negatively affect utilisation of health services and has led to 
inequities in financial protection and the impoverishment of many households in those countries 
where they exist (Asenso-Okyere et al. 1998, McIntyre 2006, Xu et al. 2006, Lagarde & Palmer 2008, 
Waddington & Enyimayew 1989, van-Doorslaer et al. 2006). However, the claimed failure of tax-
funded systems is still debatable as some may argue that there is no documented empirical evidence 
that such systems really failed. This is because they were abandoned in favour of user fees and health 
sector privatisation, as a conditionality of the World Bank and the IMF under the Structural 
Adjustment Programme (Russell et al. 1999, Gilson & Mills 1995, Sahn & Bernier 1995, World Bank 
1993). In the case of Ghana, the major problem with the 1960s tax-funded system perhaps was 
insufficient budgetary allocations to the health sector.  That could partly be explained to be due to the 
absence of an earmarked tax like the current NHIS levy for health care and hence health was 

















Though an OTPP potentially can lead to increases in NHIS coverage especially within the informal 
sector if it does not involve substantial initial direct payments, the feasibility for its implementation 
and sustainability will largely depend on how it will be designed. Lack of stakeholder understanding 
of the policy concept and excessive politicisation will be the main challenges to its implementation. It 
is therefore not possible to conclude whether it is currently feasible to implement the policy or not 
since many powerful stakeholders are very uncertain about its impact and hence have not taken clear 
positions on it. The government and the policy-drivers need to clearly communicate to stakeholders 
what form the OTPP will take to enable Ghanaians engage in an informed debate on it.   Also, the 
policy issue needs to be depoliticised and independent studies and public debates organised on it to 
examine its feasibility and long-term sustainability within the current Ghanaian economic context and 
historical experience of health care financing. The stakeholders’ concerns captured in this study need 
to be critically considered before proceeding with further attempts to implement the policy. Those 
LMICs considering universal coverage reforms should be aware that terminology of reforms that do 
not directly reflect policy objectives can lead to confusion among stakeholders.  
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Part D: Opinion piece  
Universal health care coverage in Ghana:  Focusing on the policy objective  
Gilbert Abotisem Abiiro 
Work count: 3,070 
Introduction 
This paper critically examines the main issues that are being raised by stakeholders 
concerning the proposed one-time NHIS premium payment (OTPP) policy in Ghana, in 
relation to international debates on universal coverage.  Based on the evidence presented, the 
paper argues that the OTPP debate is currently more focused on the policy instrument of a 
one-time premium to the neglect of the policy objective of a universal health care system, 
which was stated in the National Democratic Congress (NDC) manifesto of 2008. The paper 
therefore calls for a more evidence-based debate, dr wing on international experience and 
empirical research findings on how a truly universal health care system, which is the ultimate 
objective of health insurance, can be achieved, rather than just whether a one-time premium 
policy should be implemented in Ghana. 
The evidence-base for this paper is drawn from a study conducted by the author about the 
views and positions of various stakeholders on this policy issue (Abiiro forthcoming).  The 
data was collected between November 2010 and February 2011 through 28 in-depth 
interviews with politicians, technocrats, academics and labour unions in Accra, health 
workers and staff of two District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (DMHIS), one in the 
north and the other in the south of the country, 6 focus group discussions with intended 
















International context of universal coverage debate 
Member states of the World Health Organisation (WHO) committed themselves in 2005 to 
the implementation of universal health systems (WHO 2005b, WHO 2010).  A universal 
health system aims at ensuring that all residents have adequate access to needed health care 
without being required to make (substantial) out-of-pocket payments for health care at the 
time of illness (WHO 2010, Carrin, James 2004). Health care financing systems that pool 
resources and risk through taxes and/or insurance contributions are the instruments for 
achieving universal coverage in health care (WHO 2010, Kutzin 2007). Evidence has 
however shown that contributory insurance schemes, as an instrument for achieving universal 
coverage, have been very difficult to implement among the poor and those who work outside 
the formal sector (WHO 2005a). Hence, coverage of the informal sector remains a major 
policy priority in international debates on universal coverage.  
Historical context of health care financing in Ghana 
During the colonial period, health care in Ghana was funded through out-of-pocket payments 
(Arhinful 2003). This restricted access to modern health services to a privileged minority 
because most people could not afford the fees.  Immediately after independence in 1957, 
health care in all public facilities was fully funded from general tax revenue (Agyepong, 
Adjei 2008).  This tax-funded system was not sustained due to economic recession in the 
1970s which negatively affected government revenue and hence insufficient funds were 
allocated for health care. It was therefore abandoned in favour of the introduction of nominal 
user fees in the early 1970s and substantial fee payment at the point of service in 1985, 
popularly known as the “cash-and-carry” system, based on a loan conditionality imposed by 
the IMF and the World Bank under a Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) (World Bank 
1993, Gilson, Mills 1995).  Under the “cash-and-carry system”, exemptions were introduced 
















(Garshong et al. 2001, Nyonator et al. 1996). Community-based health insurance schemes 
emerged in the 1990s to replace this user fee system but they were limited in population 
coverage (Atim et al. 2001). 
 In 2004, arising from a campaign promise, a mandatory national health insurance scheme 
(NHIS) was introduced by the then ruling NPP to replace out-of-pocket payments for health 
care, with the ultimate goal of achieving universal coverage (MOH 2004). The NHIS is 
largely tax-funded with about 70% of its funds coming from a 2.5% National Health 
Insurance (NHI) levy placed on all goods and services that attract valued added tax (VAT) 
(NHIA 2010, Results for Development Institute, Adjei 2010).  
Another source of NHIS funding is a monthly deduction equivalent to 2.5% of the payroll 
from each formal sector worker’s contributions to the Social Security and National Insurance 
Trust (SSNIT) pension fund. Though  some have referred to this payroll deduction as the 
premiums paid by SSNIT contributors  (Agyepong, Adjei 2008, Wahab 2008), SSNIT 
contributors have been assured under the NHIS Act, ACT 650, 78 (3) that the deductions 
from their pension fund contributions will not affect their future pension payment  
(Agyepong, Adjei 2008, Wahab 2008). The pension payment will be based on the full 17.5% 
of payroll  contributions to SSNIT and not the remaining 15% after the 2.5% deduction for 
the NHIS. In effect, the SSNIT component is a form of loan to government rather than a 
health insurance premium. Moreover, SSNIT contributors are exempted from making direct 
premium payments to their District Mutual Health Insurance Schemes (DMHIS) with which 
all Ghanaians are required to register. Only informal sector workers and those formal sector 
workers who are not covered by the SSNIT pension fund are required to make an annual 
premium contribution to their DMHIS before they are registered with the NHIS.  Children 
















entitled to NHI membership while being exempted from premium payments, though these 
exemptions have been poorly implemented. This implies that though every Ghanaian 
contributes to the NHIS through the NHI levy, an extra contributory burden is placed mainly 
on informal sector households. Those informal sector households who are not able to pay the 
insurance premium and who are not granted a premium exemption will therefore not have the 
opportunity of benefiting from the NHI levy and other government revenue channelled to the 
NHIS. A number of studies have revealed that the poor and informal sector workers are less 
frequently enrolled in the NHIS (Gyapong et al. 2007, Asante, Aikins 2007, MOH 2009, 
Ansah et al. 2009, Akazili 2010, Oxfam et al. 2011), partly because of the requirement to pay 
an annual premium (Akazili 2010). This calls into question equity in the current operation of 
the NHIS and the ability of the scheme to achieve universal coverage if the annual premium 
is maintained. 
The proposed one-time NHIS premium payment (OTPP) policy 
In 2008, the current ruling party (then opposition) made an election promise to implement a 
universal health insurance system which “will guarantee access to free health care in all 
public health institutions” (NDC Manifesto 2008:68). A one-time premium payment (OTPP) 
system was proposed as one of the instruments for achieving the policy objective of the free 
universal health care system.  Policy-makers and the general public have, however, 
christened the intended reforms by its policy instrument, a “one-time premium”.  Since 
there is currently no formal policy proposal in the public domain, the NDC manifesto remains 
the main official document on this policy issue. The policy issue has been very controversial 
and highly politicised within Ghana and internationally (Abiiro forthcoming, Oxfam et al. 
















OTPP debate  
Evidence from my study (Abiiro forthcoming) indicates that there is no consensus among 
stakeholders with regard to the meaning of the one-time premium, what will be an 
appropriate amount for the OTPP and how the OTPP will be calculated. Some, mainly 
politicians of the ruling party, civil society organisations and informal sector workers, who 
are likely to have viewed the policy issue on the basis of its broader objective, argue that a 
one-time premium should require Ghanaians to pay a once-off token amount that is not 
significantly higher than the current annual premium level, in order to benefit freely from 
health care for their entire life-span. This implies that health care will be fully funded from 
government revenue. However, other stakeholders (mainly opposition politicians, technocrats 
and some academics) who perhaps focused on the policy instrument, argue that since the 
manifesto stated that it would be a premium (one-time premium), then it means that an 
actuarially determined premium (Nketia 2011) based on the net present value (NPV) of all 
future premiums will have to be calculated for a single life-time payment (Adu-Gyamerah 
2010).   It is not clear what the policy objective of such a payment would be. 
It seems the policy-makers have also not been clear about the policy issue. Some political 
proponents of the policy argue that the one-time premium entails the provision of free health 
care (Koomson 2010), which will probably be funded from  general public revenue such as 
taxes (Abiiro forthcoming) and part of the oil revenue (Gobah 2010).  However, the Chief 
Executive Officer of the National Health Insurance Authority (NHIA) recently announced an 
intention to introduce a two-tier NHIS system, where the annual premium system will be 
allowed to run simultaneously with a one-time premium and membership to either tier will be 
based on choice (Gadugah 2011). This notion of a two-tier system seems to indicate that the 
one-time premium may not be affordable to every Ghanaian and again raises the question of 
















My study shows that few stakeholders are likely to support an actuarially calculated OTPP 
based on the NPV of lifetime NHIS contributions, because it will not be affordable to most 
informal sector households (Abiiro forthcoming). Also, some opposition politicians have 
raised the concern that a two-tier system will create a class structure in Ghana and further 
widen inequities in access to health care (Gadugah 2011).  It is perhaps against this 
background that fully funding the NHIS contributions of all non-SSNIT contributors (mainly 
informal sector workers) from government revenue was suggested by Akazili (2010) as the 
surest way of attaining universal coverage in Ghana. This has also been advocated by some 
civil society organisations in Ghana (Oxfam et al. 2011, Dadzie 2011). Moreover, this seems 
to be in line with the current international debates and experience on universal coverage 
(McIntyre 2010, Tangcharoensathien et al. 2011).  
However, many scholars have highlighted the need to pay attention to the important role a 
country’s unique historical, socio-economic, political and environmental conditions play in 
the success of health care financing reforms when recommending or debating universal 
coverage reform options for LMICs (WHO 2010, McIntyre 2010, Mills 2007, McIntyre, 
Kutzin 2010, Wagstaff 2010).  It is therefore the peculiar Ghanaian context that should be 
critically considered in the design of the OTPP policy, with a specific focus on whether and 
how the OTPP can contribute to achieving universal coverage. 
 A debate focusing on the policy objective 
The current debate in Ghana should be focused on how the policy objective of a universal 
health care system can be achieved. The debate should be directed at what would be the most 
efficient and equitable way of funding coverage for the non-SSNIT contributors (specifically 
informal sector) in order to achieve universal coverage. Ghanaians need to debate whether the 
















for those outside the SSNIT pension scheme in order to achieve universal coverage. From the 
evidence gathered from my study and a review of existing literature, the following potential 
advantages and disadvantages can be raised about each of the options within the Ghanaian 
context. 
If the current contributory premium system is maintained, the following may be the 
advantages:  
 It will continue to provide an additional source of revenue for the NHIS. This is a 
flexible source of revenue that DMHISs depend on while they wait for transfers of 
tax-subsidies from the government through the NHIA to them.  
 The collection of the annual premium is a source of employment for some people 
(premium collectors). 
  Paying a premium may instil in clients a sense of ownership of the scheme and make 
them individually feel responsible for their health and health care. 
However, the disadvantages of maintaining the current system include: 
 The collection of premiums from the informal sector in Ghana is time-consuming, 
expensive and sometimes associated with fraud on the part of premium collectors 
(Akazili 2010), yet informal sector premiums only constitute about 5% of NHIS 
revenue (Results for Development Institute, Adjei 2010).  
 The requirement of paying a premium for enrolment denies the poor and those in the 
informal sector, who cannot afford these payments and cannot secure premium 
exemptions, access to health care and benefits from the NHI levy and other tax 
















 These contributions are very regressive since they are often fixed at a flat rate and 
hence impose a higher burden of NHIS payments on the poor.  
 .On the other hand, the arguments that can be advanced for and against a fully tax-
funded health care system include: 
 It will promote equity in access to health care. This is because everybody contributes 
to taxes, especially indirect taxes, and hence everybody should also benefit from 
health care. A fully tax-funded system (particularly using indirect taxes) can therefore 
make the NHIS a truly universal health insurance system. 
 Also, taxes are easier to collect than insurance premiums. Especially in the case of 
Ghana, where there is already a dedicated tax (NHI levy) for health care, a potential 
way forward for implementing a tax-funded health care system could be to increase 
this levy. This is not only because this levy through VAT is slightly progressive 
(McIntyre et al. 2008), but dedicated taxes in general can guarantee sustainable 
funding for health care since there is little flexibility for governments to relocate this 
revenue (Savedoff 2004). 
Its disadvantages however include:  
 Ghanaians are often not willing to accept additional (general) taxation (Addison, Osei 
2001). However, people are more likely to accept payment of insurance premiums 
from which they receive specific health service benefits (Wagstaff 2010, McIntyre 
2007). 
 In Ghana, the transfer of funds from the central level to the local level is often 
associated with delays. If the annual premium payment is removed and transfers of 
















claims will also be delayed. If claims are not paid promptly, the revenue of health 
facilities will be negatively affected and this can lead to shortages of drugs at facilities 
since providers depend on such funds to purchase medicines. 
 It may be difficult to sustain a fully tax-funded system in Ghana since the earlier one 
was not maintained. High population growth and associated increasing demand on 
publicly funded health services, economic instability and lack of citizens’ trust in the 
continued existence of political commitment are the issues Ghanaians consider as 
potential threats to the sustainability of a fully tax-funded health care system. 
 An inevitable increase in utilisation of health care under a fully tax-funded system in 
the midst of the current limited health care facilities and personnel will increase the 
workload of providers. This can lead to overcrowding at health facilities, delays in 
seeing patients, poor attitude of health providers towards clients and hence, can 
negatively affect the quality and efficiency of health service provision in Ghana. 
The above are the issues that Ghanaians should be focusing on to contribute to a constructive 
debate about how best to achieve universal coverage. Notwithstanding the above, a creative 
exploration of not yet discussed alternatives could be built into the debate, keeping in mind 
questions that fit with the ultimate objective of universal coverage such as how to mobilize 
adequate revenue, how to expand coverage to all and how to protect the poor. The debate on 
these issues needs to be contextualised within the Ghanaian socio-political and economic 
setting. It should be driven by a clear understanding of the historical context of health care 
financing in Ghana and the realities of the design and operation of the current NHIS.  Also, 

















In engaging in this debate, it is important to recognise that the core purpose for the current 
insurance contributions is to raise revenue from the informal sector. Given that there are other 
ways of generating revenue from this group, for example through indirect taxes, what would 
be the best way to raise this revenue? From an efficiency point of view, it is relatively more 
efficient to collect indirect taxes from the informal sector than insurance premiums. From an 
equity perspective, is it really feasible to identify those who are unable to afford insurance 
premiums in order to exempt them and provide financial protection and needed care to all 
residents or it is more feasible to collect revenue (e.g. through indirect taxes) from those in 
the informal sector with the ability-to-pay? It also needs to be explored whether collecting 
informal sector contributions through (earmarked) indirect taxes will really have an impact on 
(ownership) perceptions of the health system if residents are aware that the taxes paid by 
them are used to cater for their health care?   
The other issues raised in the debate such as utilisation increases, possible misuse of health 
services and poor quality of care will exist irrespective of whether health care is funded from 
insurance premiums or taxes. Such issues therefore need to be addressed through other policy 
instruments; for example, addressing utilisation increases through primary care gate-keeping; 
and delays in transfers from the NHIA through improved fund management. 
Conclusion 
The Ghanaian debate on OTPP needs be refocused on how the intended policy objective of a 
universal health care system can be achieved instead of how a one-time premium will be 
implemented. Drawing lessons from international experience and debates on the feasibility of 
extending insurance coverage to workers outside the formal sector, the debate should be 
directed at whether the current contributory NHIS model for the non-SSNIT contributors 
















removed so that health care is fully funded from (potentially earmarked indirect) taxes. 
Switching to an earmarked tax-funded system is desirable and has greater prospects for 
universal coverage in Ghana given that most formal sector workers are already exempted 
from premium payments. But, as pointed out by some scholars, the current Ghanaian 
economic environment may not be favourable for its immediate implementation (Agyepong, 
Orem & Hercot 2011). It is therefore necessary that it should be at least considered as the 
strategic direction of the NHIS. The time to work towards this cherished goal is now. Every 
stakeholder needs to participate in the debate and this is the time for the academic community 
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PART E: Appendices 
Appendix A:  Data collection instruments 
Interview Guide 1 (For the main policy drivers: Minister, CEO and Staff of NHIS and other top 
government Officials) 
           Date: ------------------------          ID #: --------------------------  
Category of stakeholder----------------------------- 
Organisation-------------------------- 
Position in organisation-------------------------------- 
1. What is the one-time payment policy? 
2. What would you say are the main reasons for implementing this one-time payment 
policy? 
3. What are your views with regards to this policy (thus in terms of its advantages and 
disadvantages) 
4. What do you think the impact of the one-time payment policy will be on the development 
of the Ghanaian National Health Insurance System? (probe for whether it will contribute 
to universal coverage or not and how) 
5. Which stakeholders do you think are likely to support the implementation of the one-time 
payment policy? 
6. Why do you think each of those stakeholders will support the implementation of the 
policy? (probe for what  they stand to gain) 
7. Which stakeholders do you think are likely to oppose the implementation of the one-time 
payment policy?  
8. Why do you think each of those actors will oppose the implementation of the policy? 
(probe for what  they stand to lose) 
9. Do you think those stakeholders have the ability to influence the implementation of the 
















10. How easy do you think it will be for the one-time payment policy to be implemented in 
Ghana? (Probe for prospects and challenges of implementation) 
11. What do you think needs to be done to deal with implementation challenges of the one-
time payment policy? 





































 Interview Guide 2– (Politicians, Legislators, Opinion leaders, Donors, Labour Unions)       
Date: ------------------------          ID #: --------------------------  
Category of stakeholder----------------------------- 
Organisation--------------------------           Location--------------------------- 
Position in organisation-------------------------------- 
1.  Have you heard of the proposed one-time NHIS payment policy? 
2. If so, how did you hear of it? 
3. What do you understand a one-time payment to mean? 
4. What do you think is the reason why the government wants to implement a one-time NHIS 
payment policy? 
5.  What do you think are the advantages and disadvantages of the one-time payment policy to the 
development of the Ghanaian National Health Insurance System? (Probe for whether and how it could 
contribute to Universal coverage) 
6. What are your views on the one-time payment policy (are you in favour of it or not)? 
a) I strongly support it                  (            ) 
b) I somewhat support it               (            ) 
c) I do not support nor oppose it   (            ) 
d) I somewhat oppose it                (            ) 
e) I strongly oppose it                    (            ) 
 
If stakeholder answers a, b, or c, continue with #7 but If stakeholder answers d or e, go to question 
NO. 8. 
7. Only For those who answer “a,””b,” or “c” to question #6: 
a) What is the reason for your support for the implementation of the policy? 
















c)  Are there any conditions under which you will tend to oppose the policy instead of supporting it? 
(If yes, probe for such conditions)  
8.  Only For those who answered “d” or “e” to question #6: 
a) What is the reason for opposing the implementation of the policy? 
b)  Are you able to demonstrate this opposition? If so how? 
c)  Are there any conditions under which you will tend to support the policy instead of opposing it? (If 
yes, probe for such conditions) 
9. Questions about other stakeholders who are likely to support the implementation of the 
policy 
9 a. Which other organizations, departments within an organization or persons do you think will 
support the one-time payment policy in the way you defined it? (Probe for a list of stakeholders and 
their level of support) 
9 b. What do you think would be the reason for the positions such stakeholders would take on the 
policy? (Probe for what each of the stakeholders would gain or lose from the policy implementation) 
9c. Do you think that such stakeholders have the ability to influence the policy? (Probe for sources of 
influence and how stakeholder support will be demonstrated) 
10. Questions about other stakeholders who are likely to oppose the implementation of the 
policy 
10a. which other organizations, departments within an organization or persons do you think will 
oppose the one-time payment policy? (Probe for a list of stakeholders and the level of opposition) 
10b. what do you think would be the reason for opposing the one-time payment policy from being 
implemented? (Probe for what each of the stakeholders would gain or lose from the policy 
implementation) 
10c Do you think that such stakeholders have the ability to influence the policy? (Probe for sources of 


















11. Stakeholders ‘opinions on possible policy options 
Note: (Only read out the option that differs from stakeholders’ understanding of the policy) 
( WILL BE VERY FLEXIBLE HERE) 
11a. If a one-time payment policy requires that citizens pay just an NHIS registration fee  without 
NHIS premiums in order to benefit freely from health care for the rest of their life time, will you 
change your position (support or oppose) on the policy? How? And why? What about the position of 
other actors? 
11b. If under a one-time payment, the present value of all future premiums is calculated for citizens to 
pay at once in order to benefit freely from health care for the rest of their lives, will your position 
(support or oppose) on it change? How? and why? What about the position of other actors? 
13. How easy do you think it will be for the one-time payment policy to be implemented in Ghana? 
(Probe for prospects and challenges of implementation) 
14. If you were giving the opportunity, what will you suggest to the government in relation to the 
implementation of the one-time payment policy? 


























Interview Guide three (3)–(Staff of MOH, DMHIS, and GHS, frontline implementers (doctors, 
nurses and pharmacists) 
Date: ------------------------          ID #: --------------------------  
Category of stakeholder----------------------------- 
Organisation-------------------------- Location---------------------------- 
Position in organisation-------------------------------- 
1. Have you heard of the proposed one-time NHIS payment policy? 
2.  If so how did you first hear about the one-time payment policy? 
3.  What do you understand a one-time payment to mean? 
4. What do you think will be the impact of a one-time payment policy on you and your 
organisation/profession as you defined it? ( probe for impact on workload) 
5.  What do you think will be the disadvantages of a one-time payment policy to you and your 
organization/profession as you defined it? 
6. What are your views on the one-time payment policy (are you in favour of it or not)? 
a) I strongly support it                   (            ) 
b) I somewhat support it                (            ) 
c) I do not support nor oppose it   (            ) 
d) I somewhat oppose it                (            ) 
e) I strongly oppose it                   (            ) 
7. What is the reason for the position you have taken on the policy?   
8. Under what condition would you change your position on the policy? 
9. What do you think will be expected of you for the successful implementation of the policy? 
10.  Questions about other stakeholders who are likely to support policy: 
10 a). Which organizations, departments within an organization or persons/professions do you think 
will support the one-time payment policy in the way you defined it? (Probe for list of stakeholders) 
10 b). What do you think would be the reason for the positions such stakeholders would take on the 
















10c). Do you think that such stakeholders have the ability to influence the policy? (probe for sources 
of influence and how stakeholder support or opposition will be demonstrated) 
11. Questions about other stakeholders who are likely to oppose the implementation of the 
policy: 
11a). which organizations, departments within an organization, or persons/professions do you think 
will oppose the one-time payment policy? (Probe for list of stakeholders) 
11b). what do you think these opponents will gain from preventing the one-time payment policy from 
being implemented? 
12. Stakeholders’opinions on possible policy options 
Note: (Only use the option that differs from that of stakeholders’ understanding of the policy) 
12a. If a one-time payment policy requires that citizens pay just a registration fee  without NHIS 
premiums in order to benefit freely from health care for the rest of their life time, will you change 
your position (support or oppose) on the policy? How? and why? What about the position of other 
actors? 
12b. If under a one-time payment the present value of all future premiums is calculated for citizens to 
pay at once in order to benefit freely from health care for the rest of their lives, will your position 
(support or oppose) on it change? How? and why? What about the position of other actors? 
 13. How easy do you think it will be for the one-time payment policy to be implemented in Ghana? 
(Probe for prospects and challenges of implementation) 
14. If you were giving the opportunity, what will you suggest to the government in relation to the 
implementation of the one-time payment policy? 


















Focus Group Discussion Guide: Community level and formal sector workers (SSNIT 
contributors) 
Details of participants (to be filled in before discussions) 
 Sex, educational qualification, NHIS membership Status, type of scheme registered with, 
duration with the scheme, district, region 
1. Participants’ awareness and understanding of one-time payment 
 Have they heard of a one-time payment 
 How did they hear about it? 
  What do they understand a one-time payment to mean? 
  What do they think is the reason why the government wants to implement a one-time NHIS 
payment policy? 
2. Participant’s expectations and interest in policy 
 What do they expect from the one-time payment policy? 
 What do they think is expected of them in a one-time payment 
 What do they think would be the potential benefits of a one-time payment for them 
  What do they think would be the potential disadvantages for  them of a one-time payment 
3. Participants positions on the policy (support or oppose policy) and reasons 
4.  Do they think they have the ability to influence the policy implementation? How?  
5. Which other stakeholders do participants think would support the policy and why 
6.  Which stakeholders do participants think would oppose the policy and why? 
7. Participants’ opinions on various policy options 
a)  Paying just a registration fee and would benefit from health care for the rest of their life time 
















b)   Paying the present value of all future premiums at once in order to benefit freely from health 
care for the rest of their lives (probe for stakeholders positions and concerns and that of 
others) 
8.  What concerns or fears do participants have with regards to the implementation of the policy in 
general? 
9. If given the opportunity, what will participants recommend for a successful policy implementation?  




































Data extraction sheet  






Reasons for position / concerns raised  
Power  and power sources  
Likely influence on policy  
Perception of prospects and challenges for 



























Appendix B: Consent Forms 
Consent Form 1 – Interviews (key stakeholders) 
This form will be read out to the participant before conducting the interview. After reading it out, the 
participants will be asked whether they have any questions or concerns about their participation in the 
study and if there are any concerns, they will be appropriately addressed before the interview. The 
consent form will be signed by the participant in the presence of the principal investigator. A copy of 
the consent form will be left with the participant.  
General Introduction 
You have been contacted to participate in a study on the proposed one-time national health insurance 
payment policy in Ghana. This study is being conducted by me, an MPH (Health Economics) student 
of the University of Cape Town in South Africa for my Masters dissertation. As an important 
stakeholder of health insurance issues in Ghana, it is important for me to obtain your opinion and that 
of your organization/institution/department on the proposed one-time payment policy. You are 
therefore being invited to participate in the interviews for this study which are administered to only 
key stakeholders. 
Purpose and process 
This study is conducted to explore the opinions of various stakeholders with regards to the one-time 
NHIS payment policy in Ghana. If you decide that you will like to participate in this study you will be 
interviewed by me. The questions that I will ask you are basically around: 
 Your understanding of the one-time payment policy 
 Your interest in the one-time payment policy 
  Your position and concerns about the policy 
















 What you anticipate the prospects and challenges for the implementation of the policy to 
be. 
 Other interesting issues on the one-time payment policy that might come out during our 
discussion about the above topics 
I plan to conduct about 30 to 35 interviews to produce a comprehensive report on the opinions of the 
major stakeholders on the policy. Each interview will take approximately 60 minutes. 
Potential risks of your participation 
There is very minimal risk of participating in this study.  However, since the questions are about your 
opinion on the policy, I acknowledge that if the study makes known your opinion to the policy drivers 
or government, it may result into victimisation at the work place (if you are a staff/employee of 
MOH/NHIA) or damage the relationship between you/ your organisation and the government if your 
opinion is against the policy. The study however intends to address this by ensuring that all 
information gathered from these interviews are treated confidentially and the findings will be 
presented in a way that individuals/organisations will not be identified by names with their opinions. 
There are however, no major psychological and physical stresses of participating in this study except 
that you may have to forgo other activities in order to respond to the interviews. 
Potential benefits of the research 
There are no direct material benefits to you as an individual of participating in this study. However, 
since the results will be made available to the National Health Insurance Authority to assist in 
finalizing the policy, this study offers you a potential platform to make known your opinion on the 
proposed policy issue. Also, your opinion and that of others, if taken into account by the policy 
drivers, will increase the possibility of coming out with a health insurance policy that will be widely 
acceptable to all Ghanaians. Hence your participation in this study offers wider benefits to the 
















Participation and withdrawal 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You can choose either to participate or not to. That is 
why your involvement in this study had been fully explained and you are asked to freely consent to it. 
You also have the option to discontinue your participation in the interview at any time without any 
adverse consequences. 
Is there any other information you will like to know about the study?   
Do you agree to participate in the study?  
This study has been granted ethical approval by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the 
University of Cape Town, South Africa, and the Ghana Health Service, Accra, Ghana (see contact 
addresses below). 
Should you have any questions after the interview you are welcome to contact the following: 
Gilbert Abotisem Abiiro (Prinicpal Researcher)               Prof. Diane McIntyre (Supervisor) 
University for Development Studies                                Health Economics Unit 
Faculty of planning and land Management                       Faculty of Health Sciences 
Post Office Box 520                                                         Anzo Road, Observatory 7925 
Wa, Upper West Region, Ghana                                           University of Cape Town, South Africa 
Tel: +233249325818                                                        Tel:+27 824962345 
gilbiiro@yahoo.com                                                         Diane.McIntyre@uct.ac.za 
 
Human Research Ethics Committee                     Ghana Health Service Ethical Review Committee 
University of Cape Town, South Africa                 Research and Development Division 
Faculty of Health Sciences                                    Ghana Health Service 
Road, Observatory 7925                                        Post Office Box MB 190 
Cape Town, South Africa                                      Accra, Ghana 


















Statement of Consent (the one granting consent) 
I declare that I have understood all that has been read out and explained to me. I am willing to 
participate in the study and I therefore grant my consent to participate in the study. 
 
Signature Participant: --------------------------                                            Date--------------------             
          































Consent Form 2 – FGDs (community level beneficiaries and SSNIT contributors) 
This form will be read out to the participants before conducting the FGDs.  After reading it out, the 
participants will be asked whether they have any questions or concerns about their participation in the 
study and if there are any concerns, they will be appropriately addressed. The consent form will be 
signed /thumb printed individually by the participants in the presence of the principal investigator. A 
copy of the consent form will be left with each participant.  
General Introduction 
You have been contacted to participate in a study on the proposed one-time National Health Insurance 
payment policy (OTPP) in Ghana. This study is being conducted by me, an MPH (Health Economics) 
student of the University of Cape Town in South Africa for my Masters dissertation. As a potential 
beneficiary of the proposed one-time payment policy therefore, it is important for me to obtain your 
opinion as a group on the proposed one-time payment policy. You are therefore being invited to 
participate in the FGDs for this study which are administered only to potential beneficiaries of the 
proposed OTPP. 
Purpose and process 
This study is conducted to explore the opinions of various stakeholders with regards to the one-time 
NHIS payment policy in Ghana. If you decide that you will like to participate in this FGDs discussion. 
The issues that we will discuss are basically around: 
 Your understanding of the one-time payment policy 
 Your interest in the one-time payment policy 
  Your position and concerns about the policy 
 You opinion about the position and concerns of other stakeholders about the policy 

















 And other interesting issues on the one-time payment policy that might come out during 
our discussion about the above topics 
I plan to conduct about 6 FGDs in all. Three of these FGDs would be in this district of which one is 
for SSNIT contributor (teachers) and one for men and the other for women at the community level. 
The other 3 FGDs would be conducted in similar way at (NAME) district in the (NORTH or SOUTH) 
of Ghana. Each FGD is expected to last between 60 to 90 minutes. 
Potential risks of your participation 
There is very minimal risk of participating in this study. However, since the topic for discussion is 
about your opinion on the proposed policy, I acknowledge that if the study makes known your opinion 
to the policy drivers or government, they may tend to have a negative perception of you if your 
opinion is not in favour of the policy. The study however intends to address this by ensuring that all 
information gathered from these discussions are treated confidentially and the findings will be 
presented in a way that you will not be identified by name with your opinion.  
There is however, no any anticipated psychological and/or physical stress of participating in this study 
except that you may have to forgo other activities in order to take part in the FGDs. 
Potential benefits for participating in the study 
There are no direct material benefits to you as an individual or group for participating in this study. 
However, since the results will be made available to the National Health Insurance Authority to assist 
in finalizing the policy, this study offers you a potential platform to make known your opinion on the 
proposed policy issue. Also, your opinion and that of others, if taken into account by the policy 
drivers, will increase the possibility of coming out with a health insurance policy that will be widely 
acceptable to all Ghanaians. Hence your participation in this study offers wider benefits to the 

















Participation and withdrawal 
Your participation in this study is voluntary. You can choose either to participate or not to. That is 
why your involvement in this study has been fully explained and you are asked to freely consent to it. 
You also have the option to discontinue your participation in the discussion at any time without any 
adverse consequences. 
Is there any other information you will like to know about the study?   
Do you agree to participate in the study?  
I would also like to add that this study has been granted ethical approval by the Human Research 
Ethics Committee of the University of Cape Town, South Africa, and the Ghana Health Service, 
Accra, Ghana (see contact addresses below) 
Should you have any questions after the FGD, you are welcome to contact the following: 
Gilbert Abotisem Abiiro (Prinicpal Researcher)                Prof. Diane McIntyre (Supervisor) 
University for Development Studies                                   Health Economics Unit 
Faculty of planning and land Management                       Faculty of Health Sciences 
Post Office Box 520                                                                 Anzo Road, Observatory 7925 
Wa, Upper West Region, Ghana                                           University of Cape Town, South Africa 
Tel: +233249325818                                                              Tel:+27 824962345 
gilbiiro@yahoo.com                                                                Diane.McIntyre@uct.ac.za 
 
Human Research Ethics Committee                     Ghana Health Service Ethical Review Committee 
University of Cape Town, South Africa                 Research and Development Division 
Faculty of Health Sciences                                    Ghana Health Service 
Road, Observatory 7925                                        Post Office Box MB 190 
Cape Town, South Africa                                      Accra, Ghana 

















Statement of Consent (the one granting consent) 
I declare that I have understood all that has been read out and explained to me. I am willing to 
participate in the study and I therefore grant my concern to participate in the study. 
 
Signature Participant: --------------------------                                            Date---------------             
          
Signature Principal Investigator ---------------------------                          Date---------------------            
Translator (only applicable to Community level FGDs) 
I declare that I read this document to the participant and answered the participants’ questions to the 
best of my knowledge. This conversation was conducted in [enter language]. 
























Appendix C: Information for authors: Journal of Health Policy and Planning 
OPEN ACCESS OPTION FOR AUTHORS See here for details of our Open Access method of 
publication.  
Health Policy and Planning's aim is to improve the design and implementation of health policies in 
low- and middle-income countries through providing a forum for publishing high quality research and 
original ideas, for an audience of policy and public health researchers and practitioners. HPP is 
published six times a year (bimonthly).  
Specific objectives are to:  
 Attract high quality research papers, reviews and debates on topics relevant to health 
policies in low- and middle-income countries;  
 Ensure wide geographical coverage of papers including coverage of the poorest 
countries and those in transition;  
 Encourage and support researchers from low- and middle-income countries to publish in 
HPP;  
 Ensure papers reflect a broad range of disciplines, methodol gies and topics;  
 Ensure that papers are clearly explained and accessible to readers from the range of 
disciplines used to analyse health policies; and  
 Provide a fair, supportive and high quality peer review process.  
Health Policy and Planning welcomes submissions of the following types: original articles, review 
papers, short reports, commentaries, and papers in our series 'How to do (or not to do)...' [for example, 
see Hutton & Baltussen, HPP, 20(4): 252-9] and '10 best resources' [for example, see David & 
Haberlen, HPP, 20(4): 260-3].  
Authors should pay close attention to the factors that will increase likelihood of acceptance. As well 
as the high overall quality required for publication in an international journal, authors should address 
HPP's readership: national and international policy makers, practitioners, academics and general 
readers with a particular interest in health policy issues and debates in low- and middle-income 
countries. Manuscripts that fail to set out the international debates to which the paper contributes, and 
to draw out policy lessons and conclusions, are more likely to be rejected, returned to the authors for 
redrafting prior to being reviewed, or undergo a slower acceptance process. In addition, economists 
should note that papers accepted for publication in HPP will consider the broad policy implications of 
an economic analysis rather than focusing primarily on the methodological or theoretical aspects of 
the study.  
Public health specialists writing about a specific health problem or service should discuss the 
relevance of the analysis for the broader health system. Those submitting health policy analyses 
should draw on relevant bodies of theory in their analysis, or justify why they have not, rather than 
only presenting a narrative based on empirical data.  
The editors cannot enter into correspondence about papers considered unsuitable for publication and 
their decision is final. Neither the editors nor the publishers accept responsibility for the views of 
authors expressed in their contributions. The editors reserve the right to make amendments to the 
papers submitted although, whenever possible, they will seek the authors' consent to any significant 
















Manuscripts must be submitted online. Once you have prepared your manuscript according to 
the instructions below please visit the online submission website. Instructions on submitting 
your manuscript online can be viewed here.  
 
Manuscripts containing original material are accepted for consideration with the understanding that 
neither the article nor any part of its essential substance, tables, or figures has been or will be 
published or submitted for publication elsewhere. This restriction does not apply to abstracts or short 
press reports published in connection with scientific meetings. Copies of any closely related 
manuscripts should be submitted along with the manuscript that is to be considered by HPP. HPP 
discourages the submission of more than one article dealing with related aspects of the same study.  
 
HPP only accepts online submission of papers, except in exceptional circumstances—where authors 
experience difficulties when trying to submit online (e.g. poor internet connection), papers can be 
emailed to the Editorial Office at Tamsin.Kelk@lshtm.ac.uk, for online submission to be carried out 
by proxy. 
During the online submission procedure, authors are asked to provide: a) information on prior or 
duplicate publication or submission elsewhere of any part of the work; b) a statement of financial or 
other relationships that might lead to a conflict of interest or a statement that the authors do not have 
any conflict of interest; c) a statement that the manuscript has been read and approved by all authors; 
d) the name, address, telephone and fax number of the corresponding author who is responsible for 
negotiations concerning the manuscript. The manuscript must be accompanied by copies of any 
permissions (see heading Permissions below) to reproduce already published material, or to use 
illustrations or report sensitive personal information about identifiable persons.  
 
All papers submitted to HPP are checked by the editorial office for conformance to author and other 
instructions all specified below. Non-conforming manuscripts will be returned to authors.  
 
Format of contributions 
Only articles in English are considered for publication. 
 
Prepare your manuscript, including tables, using a word processing program and save it as a .doc, .rtf 
or .ps file. Use a minimum font size of 11, double-spaced and paginated throughout including 
references and tables, with margins of at least 2.5 cm. The text should be left justified and not 
hyphenated. Number pages consecutively.  
 
Manuscripts should preferably be a maximum of 5000 words, excluding tables, 
figures/diagrams and references (review papers can be longer). 
 
The title page should contain: 
 Title - please keep as concise as possible and ensure it reflects the subject matter; 
 Corresponding author's name, address, telephone/fax numbers and e-mail address; 
 Each author's affiliation and qualifications; 
 Keywords and an abbreviated running title; 
 2-4 Key Messages, detailing concisely the main points made in the paper; 
















The manuscript will generally follow through sections: Abstract (no more than 300 words), 
Introduction, Methods, Results, Discussion, Conclusion, References. However, it may be appropriate 
to combine the results and discussion sections in some papers. Tables and Figures should not be 
placed within the text, rather provided at the end of the paper or in separate file/s. 
 
In the acknowledgements, all sources of funding for research must be explicitly stated, including 
grant numbers if appropriate. Other financial and material support, specifying the nature of the 
support, should be acknowledged as well. 
 
Figures should be designed using a well-known software package for standard personal computers. If 
a figure has been published earlier, acknowledge the original source and submit written permission 
from the copyright holder to reproduce the material. Colour figures are permitted but authors will be 
required to pay the cost of reproduction. 
All measures should be reported in SI units, followed (where necessary) by the traditional units in 
parentheses. There are two exceptions: blood pressure should be expressed in mmHg and 
haemoglobin in g/dl. For general guidance on the International System of Units, and some useful 
conversion factors, see 'The SI for the Health Professions' (WHO 1977). 
References must follow the Harvard system and must be cited thus: 
Baker and Watts (1993) found... 
In an earlier study (Baker and Watts 1993), it... 
Where works by more than two authors are cited, only the first author is named followed by 'et al.' 
and the year. The reference list must be typed double-spaced in alphabetical order and include the full 
title of both paper (or chapter) and journal (or book), thus: 
Baker S, Watts P. 1993. Paper/chapter title in normal script. Journal/book title in italics Volume 
number in bold: page numbers. 
Baker S, Watts P. 1993. Chapter title in normal script. In: Smith B (ed). Book title in italics. 2nd edn. 
Place of publication: Publisher's name, page numbers. 
Up to five authors should be cited. If there are more, cite the first three authors and follow with 'et al.', 
e.g.: 
Baker S, Watts P, Smith B et al. 1993. Paper title in normal script. Paper presented at 
meeting/conference title, place, date. Unpublished document. 
Authorship 
A description is required of each author's role in the research process and in preparing the manuscript 
such as conception and design of the study; analysis and interpretation of the data; and drafting the 
paper or revising it critically for substantial intellectual content. Authorship is constituted by 
participating in writing and in one of the other categories. Signed or emailed approval of the 
submitted paper by all authors is mandatory (a signature or an email from each author). We suggest 
the following wording for this declaration: "I declare that I participated in the [state contribution/s to 
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Appendix D: Budget 
Proposed budget for the study 
Expenditure Item Details Unit cost 
US$ 
Quantity 




Research Assistants (note 


















1 for 2 weeks (12 days) and  
1 for 1week (6days) in each district 
 
 




To translate consent forms and 
FGDs guide Twi and Nankam 
 
 
1 familiar with newspapers in Ghana 
to comb through all papers to 

















$13 per day 
 














































Digital voice recorder 
and accessories 
 





Documents in public 
domain (newspapers etc) 
 






Field note books 
 
Folders for holding of documents to 
field 
Thumbprint pad and ink 
 










Purchases and/or photocopies of 
such documents as newspapers with 
issues on OTTP 
 
$4 per box  
 
$10 per ream 
 













































































From Accra to Cape town 
 


























Accra for stakeholder 
interview 
Transportation to 
Districts for FGDs 
Subtotal 
for one month (NK: relatively more 
expensive rent and use motor in 
Accra than in districts)  
From Accra to Akwapem South and 
back (public transport for PI and 2 
RAs) 
From Accra to Kassena- Nankana 
District and back ((public transport 
for PI and 2 RA) 
Transportation within districts to 
conduct FGDs (hiring  and fuelling 
of two motor bites in each district) 
for 12 days in each district  
bike per day 
plus fuel 
$15 per person 
$80 per person 
$14 per motor 












Feeding of two Research 
Assistants 
Lunch for FGDs 
Reimbursement of 
transport cost for FGDs 
Liaising with community 
level gatekeepers for 
community entry and 
recruitment of FGD 
participants 
Sub-total 
A single bed room to be rented for PI 
in Accra for Stakeholder interviews 
Hotel accommodation for PI and 2 
research assistants in Akuapem 
South (12 days for PI and RA) and 
6days for the other RA) 
Hotel Accommodation for only 2 
research Assistants in kassena 
Nankan District (6 days for 1 and 12 
days for the other)
Research assistants will be provided 
with meals for two weeks (6 days for 
1 and 12 days for the other) in each 
District
To be provided for all participants at
the 6 FDGs (8-12)
Some FGDs participants would have 
to either take taxis or fuel their own 
motor bikes to attend discussion 
Customary gifts for to community 
leaders and gatekeepers 







$13 per day 
$5 per person 



















Printing , photocopying 
and binding  
Sub-total 
Consent forms, data collection 
instruments and final report 
250 
250 


























UNIVERSITY OF C\PE TOW 
08 October 2010 
HREC REF: 464/2010 
MrGAAbiiro 
C/o Prof 0 Mcintyre 
Public health & Family Medicine 
Dear Mr Abiito 
Health Sciences Faculty 
Research Ethics Committee 
Room E52-24 Groote SchuW' Hospital Old Main Building 
Observatory 7925 
Telephone [021]406 6626 • Facsimile [021]406 6411 
e-mail: lamees.emjedi@ucr.ac.za 
PROJECT TITLE: UNIVERSAL FINANCIAL PROTECTION THROUGH NATIONAL 
HEALTH INSURANCE: A STAKEHOLDER ANALYSIS OF A PROPOSED ONE-TIME NHIS 
PAYMENT POLICY IN GHANA 
Thank you for submitting your new study to the Faculty of Health Sciences I-Iuman Research Ethics 
Committee. 
It is a pleasure to inform you that the FilS I-LREC has formally approved the above-mentioned study. 
Approval is granted for onc year unti113 October 2011. 
Please send us an annual progress report (website fonn FI-IS 016) if your research continues beyond the 
approval period. Alternatively, please send us a brief summary of your findings so that we can close the 
research fi1e. 
With respect to the informed consent for participants in the focus group, please can the research assistants 
point out that confidentiality cannot be guaranteed since group members may discuss the content of meetings 
outside the group. However, members can be asked to respect each others' confidentiality. 
Please note that the ongoing ethical conduct of the study remains the responsibility of the principal 
investigator. 
















I~ CHAIRPERSON. HSF HUMAN ETHICS 
Federal Wide Assurance Number: FWAOOOO1637. 
Institutional Review Board (11m) number: IRBOOOO1938 
This serves to confirm that the University of Cape Town Research Ethics Comminee complies to the Ethics 
Standards for Clinical Research with a new drug in patients, based on the Medical Research Council (MRC-
SA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA-USA), International Convention on I-Iannorusation Good Clinical 
Practice (ICH GCP) and Declaration of Helsinki guidelines. 
The Research Ethics Committee granting this approval is in compliance with the ICH Harmonised Tripartite 
Guidelines E6: Note for Guidance on Good Clinical Practice (CPMP/ICH/ 135/95) and FDA Code Federal 

















GH ANA HEA LTH SE RVICE ETHICAL REVI EW COMMITTEE 
In case o/reply Ihe 
number and dale of Illis 
Leller should be quoled 
My R'f ,GHS-ERC 3 
Your Ref. No. 
Research & Development Division 
Ghana Health Service 
P. O. Box MB 190 
Accra 
Tef: +233~0302-681 109 
Fax + 233-0302-685424 
Email: Hannah.Frimpong@ghsmail.org 
December 9, 2010 
GILBERT ABOTISEM ABIIRO, Principal Investigator 
ETHICAL CLEARANCE - ID NO: GHS-ERC: 12111 / 10 
The Ghana Health Service Ethics Review Com mittee has reviewed and given approval fo r the 
implementation of your Study Protocol titled: 
"U nive rsa l Fina ncia l Protection th rough Na tional Hea lth Insurance: A Stakeholder Analys is of t he 
Proposed O ne-t im e NHIS Payment Policy in Gha na" 
This approval requires that you submit periodic review of the protocol to the Committee and a final f1111 
review to the Ethical Review Committee (ERC) on completion of the study. The ERC may observe or 
cause to be observed proced ures and records of the study during and after imp lementation. 
Please note that any modification of the project must be submitted to the ERC for review and approval 
before its implementation. 
You are also required to report all serious &9yerse events re lated to this study to the ERC within seven days 
verbally and fourteen days in writing. 
You are requested to submit a final report on the study to assure the ERe that the project was implemented 
as per approved protocol. You are also to inform the ERe and your mother organization before any 
publication of the research findings. 
Please always quote the protocol identification number in all future correspondence in relation to this 
protocol 
r • 
SiGNED ................................... ~.................. . 
PROFESSIO ALBERT GEORGE BAIDOE AMOAH 
(G1-1 S-ERC CHAI RMAN) 













UNIVERSITY OF CAPE TOWN 
IYUN IVESIlHI YA SI: KAP,." UN IVfRSITfIl VAN KAAPSTAD 
Dear Sir I Madam 
Health Economics Unit 
School of Public Health & Family Medicine 




T: (+2721) 406 6755 
F: (+2721) 448 8152 
Director: Dr Susan Cleary 
11 November 2010 
Research being undertaken by Mr Gilbert Abiiro 
This letter serves to confirm that Mr Abiiro is registered with our institution for the 
Masters in Public Health (specialising in Health Economics). We always encourage 
our Masters participants to undertake their dissertation research in their home 
country. Mr Abiiro has demonstrated a keen interest in health care financing issues 
and is focussing his dissertation research on an important current health care 
financing policy issue within Ghana, the proposed 'one time payment' for the NHIS. 
I would be enormously grateful if you could assist Mr Abiiro in his efforts to interview 
a wide-range of key informants in relation to this health care financing policy, for 
purposes of his Masters dissertation. We recognise that our request for an interview 
is an imposition on your very busy schedule, but, your support would be greatly 
valued and would make an important contribution to Mr Abiiro's successful 
dissertation research. His proposal has been reviewed and approved by the 
University of Cape Town's Research Ethics Committee. As his dissertation 
supervisor, I am committed to ensuring that he follows ethical research practices and 
that he treats the information you prov~e to him in an ethical way. 
, 




Professor Diane Mcintyre 
South African Research Chair in Health and Wealth 
Tel : +27-21-4066579 
Cell : +27-82-496 2345 
E-Mail: Diane.Mclntyre@uct.ac.za 
Health Economics Unit • _ 
ucr - School of Public Health & Family Mt<ficInie 
Health Scieoces Faculty 
Anzio RC':\d, Observatory 7925 














UNIVERSITY FOR DEVELOPMENT STUDIES 
(FACULTY OF PLAIININ6 AND LAND MANA6EMENT) 
WACAMPUS 
Id. ON3 Rr 281 
h-nwil· /rclllCi cl fl. Hlh(l(!. C( 1m 
Our Ref.: P. J 330 
Your Ref.: ................. . 
P. (J. Box 520 
Wa -- UWR 
GhU/lU 
I th November, 2010 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN 
Dear Sir/Madam, 
INTRODUCTION -
MR. AIHTRO GILllERT (P. 1330) 
I write to introduce to you Mr. Abiiro Gilbert who is a Senior Research Assistant 
of the Department of Planning ofthe·Faculty oFPlanning and Land Management. 
Mr. Abiiro is pursuing his MPH programme from the University of Cape Town, 
South Africa and wishes to collect data in your organisation for his research work. 
It would be apprec iated if you could offer him the necessary ass istance he mny 
need. "',.., 
Counting on your on your cooperation. 
Thank you. 
Yours faithfully, 
I A / 
l',r,ivL 
~ ...... ~ .. ... ........... .... . 
- elis Z. T:mg 
(SnL Admin. Assistant) 
For: Faculty Ofticer 
